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DEAR LANDLORD: PLEASE DON'T PUT A PRICE
ON MY SOUL:* TEACHING PROPERTY LAW




"Property rights serve human values."' Every law student
needs to emerge from the crucible of first-year property law with a
clear understanding that when "0 conveys Blackacre to A for life,
remainder to B and his heirs," 0 has created a life estate in A2 and
a future interest, a vested remainder,3 in B; or that when "0 con-
veys Blackacre to A and his heirs, but if A ever builds a liquor store
on Blackacre, then to B," 0 has created a fee simple subject to
executory limitation and has violated the common law rule against
perpetuities.' But, every student also needs to learn that property
rights serve human values if she is to become a lawyer who under-
stands and appreciates that the law must serve everyone: persons of
color, the poor, those of every gender and sexual orientation, and
must also be called upon to protect the environment. "0" may be
African-American, "A" may be gay and "B" may be living in poverty,
but all are affected by property law decisions.
In this article, I describe the cases and materials I use in my
* "Dear Landlord" © 1968 Dwarf Music, BOB DYLAN, Lyaics 1962-1985 (1998) 259.
** Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. J.D.,
1985, Temple University School of Law; B. S., 1982, University of Northern Colorado.
In a prelude to its January, 2000 Annual Meeting the Association of American Law
schools stated, "[it is our belief that the unequal distribution of income and wealth
affects virtually all aspects of the legal system and should be an important element in a
wide variety of courses across the legal curriculum. These courses include, at least,
real property..." Association of American Law Schools Newsletter Number 2000-4 at
10. The conference presented a number of insights that have been incorporated into
my teaching and this article, particularly the Workshops on "Property Wealth and
Inequality," the Concurrent session on "Pedagogy of Teaching Property Law," chaired
by Professor Reginald Robinson, Howard University, and "Property, Wealth and Ine-
quality," chaired by Robinson, and including speakers John Brittain, Texas Southern
University, Martha Mahoney, University of Miami, Frank Michelman, Harvard, and
Laura Padilla, California Western.
1 State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971).
2 THOMAS BERGIN & PAUL HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE IN-
TERESTS 34-38 (2d ed. 1984).
3 Id. at 62-73.
4 Id. at 116-17.
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first-year property class to introduce students to what I hope will be
a career-long awareness of the relationship between property law
and social justice. In so doing, I work with an existing casebook
supplemented by additional cases and articles and sometimes by
dissents or portions of cases abbreviated in the text. Herein, I ex-
amine the various casebooks available and note throughout the ar-
ticle the degree to which they provide cases and other materials
that emphasize the relationship between property law and social
justice.5 I do so with the idea that a concern for teaching social
justice can be blended into a first-year property course using availa-
ble texts and minimal supplementation.6 In many cases, I can sim-
ply add a particularly thoughtful dissent, or even just a passage
omitted from a case because it did not fit the text author's peda-
gogic purpose.7 I prefer using an available text rather than a mas-
sive stack of supplemental material for a number of reasons. First,
this approach avoids additional expense for the students. Second,
it does not greatly increase the amount of reading students are re-
quired to do. Finally, the casebook adds a sense of legitimacy to
the materials that a homemade supplement might lack.8
Further, this article examines the major cases that I use (and
some that I do not) to demonstrate that property rights serve
human values.9 I note which authors include the case under dis-
cussion, either as major cases or as note cases, whether they substi-
tute interesting alternate cases that accomplish the same goal and
the degree to which any additional notes and questions or hy-
potheticals advance the goal.10 Although some texts provide very
little in the way of useful cases, it should be emphasized at this
point that I am in no way suggesting that the authors of these texts
are insensitive to the issues with which this article is concerned,
rather one assumes that they believe it more appropriate to discuss
5 I examine fifteen casebooks in this article. I am only aware of two extant (as of
February 2001) casebooks that I do not include as they are rather old and without
recent supplementation.
6 See infra notes 12-80, and accompanying text.
7 I have attempted to document this occurrence throughout by referencing when
I am quoting from a passage of a case that is not included in the abbreviated excerpt
in the casebook.
8 See Leslie Bender, Teaching Torts as if Gender Matters: Intentional Torts, 2 VA. J.
Soc. POL'Y & L. 115, 125 n. 18 (1994) (describing how using solely one's own repro-
duced materials created problems of legitimacy in students' eyes for a feminist torts
professor).
9 See infra note 90, and accompanying text.
10 See infra note 7, and accompanying text.
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these topics in other courses, such as Constitutional Law or, for
example, Poverty Law.
As a final introductory note, one is warned that of the many
reasons why legal education can impede learning, "one is the ten-
dency of some law professors to self-indulge in their own intellec-
tual interests to the exclusion of their responsibility to educate
future members of the legal profession."" Thus, I prefer not to
"beat them over the head" with social justice issues to the exclusion
of other important material, but instead to maintain an integrated
approach.
I. TEXTS CONSIDERED
My first reference is generally to the seventh edition of John
Cribbet, Corwin Johnson, Roger Findley and Ernest Smith's Prop-
erty Cases and Materials, 2 as that is the text from which I teach. I
was essentially assigned Professor Cribbet's text, then in its sixth
edition, when I began teaching property. At that time I had the
luxury of teaching property as a two-semester, six-credit course.
Now at Syracuse, property is a one-semester five-credit course, still
a relative luxury, as much has been written about property being
reduced to a four- or even three-credit offering.1 3 One of the text's
strengths is that it was designed for a six-credit course,' 4 and, thus,
covers just about any topic one would want to include in a property
course. 5 Importantly, it allows the instructor to introduce any
themes she may want, as I have done with the theme that property
rights serve human values.16 In addition, a professor with a re-
11 See Arnold, infra note 31, at 898 (citingJudge Harry Edwards, The Growing Dis-
junction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 34 (1992)).
12 JOHN CRIBBET, CORWIN JOHNSON, ROGER FINDLEY & ERNEST SMITH, PROPERTY
(7th ed. 1996).
13 See, e.g. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall and Jerome Organ, The Contemporary Property
Law Course: A Study of Syllabi, 47J. OF LEGAL ED. 205 (1997). The authors conducted
an unscientific but representative survey of forty Property syllabi from thirty-seven
schools and noted a significant trend in the reduction of hours for Property courses.
The authors noted that, although most schools taught Property as a six-credit course
in 1976, fourteen of the thirty-nine schools surveyed had reduced Property to a four-
credit course, nine had reduced it to five credits and fourteen had maintained it at
six. Further, of the latter fourteen, two were planning to reduce the number of
hours, one to four and one to five, at the time when the article was written in 1997.
See id. at n. 7.
14 See CRIBBET, supra note 12, at vi.
15 Except that, unlike most property texts, there is no case on acquisition of owner-
ship of wild animals.
16 The text is a bit light on economic analysis, although Cribbet does include brief
excerpts from POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973), see CRIBBET, supra note 12,
at 6, 462; and cases such as Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499 (1861) (first finder of
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duced amount of time to teach the course can pare off a variety of
topics that may be covered in other courses. For example, the text
thoroughly covers regulatory takings with a substantial eighty-five
pages and seven major cases, which may be covered in Constitu-
tional Law, 7 and also ventures into torts with three cases on nui-
sance doctrine."8 Further, the last section of the book contains
materials that may be shifted to a course such as Real Estate
Transactions.' 9
abandoned property who made no timely efforts to exploit it did not acquire property
interest therein) see CRIBBET, supra note 12, at 102, and Hawaii Housing Authority v.Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (in light of oligopolic holding of fee interests in land in
Hawaii, it was appropriate under the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment for
Hawaii to take land from lessors with compensation and sell back to lessees), see CRIB-
BET, supra note 12, at 783, all of which can be used to highlight the role of economics
in legal analysis.
17 See CRIBBET, supra note 12, at 815-900. Cribbet includes Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (where, as under the Kohler Act, diminution of propertyights reaches a certain point, it is a taking that must be compensated), Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (regulation is not a taking where
normal use continues and investment-backed expectations still realized), Keystone Bi-
tuminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (second Pennsylvania coal-
mining regulation not a taking where only two percent of coal made unavailable),
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304(1987) (a regulatory taking must be compensated even if temporary), Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (taking has occurred where one mil-lion dollar beachfront lot rendered unbuildable by environmental laws), Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (conditioning building permit
on granting of public easement a taking where condition did not serve legitimatepolice power purpose), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (wheregranting of permit is conditioned on some reciprocal action by landowner, no taking
where there is an essential nexus between a legitimate state interest and a condition
exacted by government and a rough proportionality between the condition sought
and the use desired), all of which are contained in, GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN
SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (13th ed.). Professor Gunther covers all of the above
mentioned cases in about twenty pages. See id. at 486-504. However, Professors Kwall
and Organ noted that the amount of time devoted to regulatory takings had actually
significantly increased since 1976, which is perhaps not surprising when one looks at
the dates of the critical cases listed above. See Kwall & Organ, supra note 13, at 209.18 See CRIBBET, supra note 12, at 663-77. CRIBBET includes Rose v. Chaikin, 453
A.2d 1378 (N.J. 1982) (noisy windmill in upscale residential development a private
nuisance), Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219 (1970) (equitable solution
of forcing cement mill to pay money to nearby homeowners utilized where closure of
nuisance would cost three hundred jobs), and Spur Industries v. Del E. Webb Devel-
opment Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Az. 1972) (where new homeowners were "coming to the
nuisance" feed lot was moved but developer paid for its cost), all of which are in-
cluded in, VICTOR ScHwARTz, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID PARTLETT, PROSSER, 'WADE &
Sc-wARTz's TORTS 802-832 (10th ed. 2000). That casebook devotes thirty pages to
nuisance and includes Boomer and Spur Industries.
19 See CRIBBET, supra note 12, at 947-1364. Professors Kwall and Organ noted a
significant decline in the amount of time devoted to real estate transactions. See Kwall
& Organ, supra note 13, at 208-09. This drop may be because students who wish to do
so can generally cover the material in a more advanced class. For example, students
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Professors Dukeminier and Krier's text is tremendously popu-
lar,20 boasting a commanding market share, perhaps in excess of
fifty percent.21 It is clearly a comprehensive treatment of tradi-
tional property law materials and entitled to its status. 22 It begins
with good coverage of Johnson v. M'Intosh,2' has a substantial sec-
tion on marital interests, 24 including three pages on same-sex is-
sues,25 and some useful coverage in the landlord-tenant and zoning
areas, 26 but it is not the best text to use to accomplish what I want
to accomplish. 7
Professor Chused's text is unique in its structure and ap-
proach. 28 As noted throughout the discussion below, it presents
excellent in-depth material on the various cases that demonstrate
that property rights do indeed serve human values. But, as noted
above, my approach is to present this concept in the context of a
fairly traditional property course, and the text is thin in the tradi-
tional topic areas of the estates in land and future interests.29  It
must be noted, however, that the text is very strong in the use of
at Syracuse can opt for courses in Real Estate Transactions I and II if they wish. See
SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW CATALOG 1999-2000, at 16.
20 JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES KRIER, PROPERTY (5th ed. 2002). For reviews of this
text, see Andrew Morris, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 997 (1999) (book review), Charles I.
Nelson, A Walk Through the Woods of the Property Course with Dukeminier and Krier's
Casebook on Property, 22 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 1013 (1999) (book review), June Carbone,
Dukeminier and Krier as Narrative: The Stories we Tell in the First Year Property Course, 32
Hous. L. REv. 723 (1995), Peter T. Wendell, The Perfect Blend of Methodology, Doctrine &
Theory, 22 SErATrLE U.L. REv. 1031 (1999) (book review).
21 See Morris, supra note 20 (reporting estimates of fifty percent market share), and
Wendell, supra note 20, at 1031-32 (describing the text as possibly the most popular
legal casebook, regardless of subject matter).
22 In no way do I intend to infer any derogatory slant to the term "traditional."
23 See infra note 153-66, and accompanying text.
24 See DuKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 20, at 382-441.
25 See id. at 438-41.
26 See id. at 460-75 (unlawful discrimination in leasing and the Fair Housing Act),
and 1064-91 (exclusionary zoning based on race, status and on household
composition).
27 Professor Morris faults the text for its lack of economic and historical context.
Morris, supra note 20 at 1002. Professor Morris' comments regarding the text's treat-
ment of State v. Shack are discussed infra note 207-20.
28 RICHARD CHUSED, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS IN PROPERTY (2d ed. 1999).
29 The basic estates are explicated in just five pages with no cases included, see id.
at 340-44; the basic future interests are presented in four pages with no cases, see id. at
344-47; destruction of Contingent Remainders is given a paragraph with one hypo-
thetical, see id. at 371-72; the Rule in Shelly's Case and the Doctrine of Worthier Title
are treated with similar brevity under the heading "Other Relics," see id. at 372. These
topics are of decreasing relevance, but then students are unlikely to ever encounter as
a client a fox hunter who has been deprived of his quarry by a farmer. Further, sub-
stantial numbers of professors cover these materials. See Kwall & Organ, infra note 71,
and accompanying text.
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defeasible fees to enforce racial segregation, so the defeasible fees
are not left uncovered.30
Professors Rabin, Kwall and Kwall's text 31 is one of two prob-
lem-oriented casebooks surveyed. I would not select the text for
my own use because I do not use the problem method, but this is
not the place to engage in the debate over problem- versus case-
oriented instruction 2.3  Further, I like using historical cases to de-
velop an understanding of why some of the black letter law of prop-
erty is counterintuitive and the text is heavily oriented toward
recent cases.33 Finally, as noted throughout, the text places less
emphasis on the social issues that are the main theme of this arti-
cle. I see no reason why a problem-oriented approach could not
be used to develop students' awareness of social issues in property
law, however.
Professors Bruce and Ely's text34 also follows a problem ap-
proach, although the problems and the materials are less fully inte-
grated than in the Rabin, Kwall and Kwall text. Some of the same
comments regarding problem-oriented texts discussed above hold.
The text generally provides very little material for discussion of the
social issues inherent in property law.
Professors Casner, Leach, French, Korngold and Vander-
Velde's text 35 is another straightforward, comprehensive survey of
30 See CHUSED, supra note 28, at 350 (discussing and reproducing Charlotte Park
Recreation Commission and Evans v. Abney).
31 EDWARD RABIN, ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KwALL &JEFFREY KwALL, FUNDAMENTALS OF
MODERN PROPERTY LAw (4th ed. 2000). For reviews of the third 1992 edition, see Craig
Arnold, How Do Law Students Really Learn? Problem-Solving, Modern Pragmatism, and
Propery Law, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 891 (1999) (book review) and Vada Lindsey, Re-
view: the Essence of Property Law, 22 SEArrTLE U. L. REv. 977 (1999) (book review).
32 For the debate over the problem- versus case-method, see Arnold, supra note 31
at 900-02; Lindsey, supra note 31, at 985-88, 986, n. 43 (citing other commentators).
See also Cynthia Hawkins-Leon, The Socratic Method-Problem Dichotomy: The Debate Over
Teaching Method Continues, Byu EDUC. LAw J. 1 (1998).
33 Professor Arnold points out (in reference to the third edition), that ninety-three
percent of the cases covered were decided after 1950 and only one, Spencer's Case,
(77 Eng. Rep. 72 (1583)) (burden of a covenant will run with the land if the original
parties intended that it do so and if the covenant touches and concerns the land), was
decided before 1800. See Arnold, supra note 31, at 909-10. Spencer's Case was
dropped from the fourth edition, which uses three modern cases, one of which
quotes from Spencer's Case, to illustrate the issue. See RABIN, KWALL & KwALL, supra
note 31, at 501-40. But see Lindsey, supra note 31, at 978 ("My use of the casebook also
enables me to teach Property Law from a historical perspective by exploring the
evolution of American property law, its derivation from early English common law, its
modern reforms, and its future.").
34 JON BRUCE & JAMES ELY, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN PROPERTY LAW
(4th ed. 1999).
35 A. JAMES CASNER, W. BARTON LEACH, SUSAN FLETCHER FRENCH, GERALD
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traditional property law. Its strengths, from the perspective of this
article, are in the areas of marital property" and in a chapter on
"Protection Against Discrimination in Housing."37
Professors Berger and Williams' text38 presents some excellent
background material for State v. Shack 9 in a sub-chapter entitled,
"The Liberal Dignity Strain: Property Rights Serve Human Val-
ues,"40 which fits well the theme of this article. They also set the
stage for semester-long themes with excerpts from thoughtful arti-
cles such as those by Professors Rose 41 and Radin.4 2 Useful materi-
als are scattered throughout, including a section on conflicting
views of landlords, 43 marital property,44 exclusionary zoning, 45 a
chapter on discrimination 46 and a brief section on "redlining" in
the chapter on real estate transactions.47
Professor Singer's text48 is a leader in the coverage of property
in the context of Native American law.49 He also includes excellent
coverage, inter alia, of slaves and former slaves,50 homelessness,5
1
KORNGOLD & LiA VANDERVELDE, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY (4th ed. 2000). See
Barry Brown, The Old Chestnut Explored: Thoughts About the Survival of Casner's Cases and
Text on Property Long Past Its Prime, 22 SEArrLE U.L. REv. 947 (1999) (review of the
third edition). Professor Brown, who was a student of Mr. Casner's and, as of last
report, teaches out of the text, provides a highly favorable review of the text, but, by
way of constructive criticism, believes the text could be enhanced by inclusion of
materials on property-related gender issues, the impact of property law on the poor
and minorities and social analysis in the area of landlord-tenant law. See id. at 962-63.
36 CASNER, ET AL, supra note 35, at 589-647. The section includes the gay rights
case of Hubert v. Williams, discussed infra note 449, and accompanying text.
37 See id. at 829-90.
38 CURTIs BERGER &JOAN WILIAMS, PROPERTY LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE (4th ed.
1997).
39 See infra notes 206-18, and accompanying text.
40 BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 38, at 90-107.
41 See id. at 68 (quoting Carol Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game The-
try, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 Yale J.L. & Human 37, 38-42 (1990) (brief
excerpt).
42 See id. at 108, (quoting Margaret Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv.
957, 959-960, 987-90 (1982).
43 See id. at 239 (contrasting residential landlords as "slumlords" versus "honest,
struggling entrepreneurs").
44 See id. at 441-97.
45 See id. at 973-99.
46 See id. at 1047-1110.
47 See id. at 1249.
48 JOSEPH SINGER, PROPERTY LAw RULES, POLICIES AND PRACTICES (3d ed. 2002).
49 See id. at 3-26, 92-98, 1183-2000, 1293-99. See infra notes 137-68, and accompany-
ing text for discussion of Native American issues, particularly in the context of John-
son v. M'Intosh.
50 See id. at 1264-78.
51 See id. at 191-95.
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the public trust doctrine, 5' racially discriminatory covenants, 53 re-
straints on marriage, 54 exclusionary zoning 5 and an entire chapter
on "Fair Housing Law."56 It does so without skimping on any areas
that I would like to see covered, and, thus, would make an excel-
lent text for use in a course that intended to teach concerns for
human values.
Professors Dwyer and Menell's text57 includes in the opening
materials a lengthy excerpt about Native American view of land
ownership and use,58 and then introduces Johnson v. M'Intosh as its
first case, but then offers little in the way of discussion-generating
material following the case. 59 The text includes some coverage of
interest, including marital property,6o a chapter on "Market Institu-
tions" which includes landlord-tenant issues such as discrimination,
rent control and low-income housing61 as well as exclusionary
zoning.62
Professor Bernhardt's text65 generally contains a few cases that
illustrate the social policy aspects of property law, but leaves out
many topics I would prefer to see covered, and often fails to in-
clude materials that would be useful in generating discussion of
the cases that are provided.
Professors Johnson, Salsich, Shaffer and Braunsteins' text 64
52 See id. at 182-91.
53 See id. at 492-511.
54 See id. at 631-38 (including an excerpt from Frug, infra note 355).
55 See id. at 997-1042.
56 See id. at 939-1042.
57 JOHN DWYER & PETER MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY A COMPARATrVE INSTI-
TUTIONAL PERSPECrVE (1998). For a review of this text see Louise A. Halper, Q. Why is
This Course Different From All Other Courses? A. Maybe It's Not, 22 Seattle U. L. Rev. 965
(1999).
58 See id. at 21-47 (quoting WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLO-
NISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND 37-49, 53-75, 128-31 (1983)).
59 See id. at 69. Prior to the case, the text states:
The decision is a minor aftershock in the far more momentous collision
between Indians and European cultures between the fifteenth and nine-
teenth centuries. Nevertheless, it raises (even if it does not satisfactorily
answer) some important questions about the cultural contingency of
every conception of property and about the origin and justification of
property rights. Id.
60 See id. at 216-72.
61 See id at 581-721.
62 See id. at 974-1005.
63 ROGER BERNHARDT, PROPERTY CASES AND MATERIALS (1999). Professor Bern-
hardt, who boldly states in his preface, "[w]elcome to the most exciting course you
will take in law school," id. at v, does not include a table of cases, so I may have
omitted some references to cited cases in his notes.
64 SANDRA JOHNSON, PETER SALSICH, JR., THOMAS SIAFFER & MICHAEL BRAUNSTEIN,
PROPERTY LAW CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (1998).
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should be commended for best integrating alternative dispute reso-
lution concepts.6" It has a number of useful cases, beginning, as
many do, with Johnson v. M'Intosh, and a lot of good material on
that case,66 but its most obvious strength lies in the direction of its
orientation.
Professors Nelson, Stoebuck and Whitman's text67 contains a
great deal of landlord-tenant law,68 and conveyancing, 69 but is not
particularly strong in the area of social justice.
Professor Burke, Burkhart and Helmholz' text7" is a fairly
traditional presentation of property, beginning with Pierson v.
Post,71 and follows along conventional lines. It seems to make little
effort to incorporate social issues and, thus, is not very compatible
with my goals.72
Professors Hylton, Callies, Mandelker and Franzese's text73
also begins with Pierson v. Post.74 It includes an entire chapter with
seven major cases on environmental issues75 and a chapter entitled
"Housing Discrimination. "76 These cases and materials, along with
such rarities as a reference to the comparative law of aboriginal
rights in Australia,77 and Commonwealth v. Ayes,78 make the book a
useful tool, especially for professors with a strong interest in intro-
ducing environmental law to first-year students.
65 See id. at 69, 81, 248, 406, 928.
66 See id. at 2.
67 GRANT NELSON, WILLIAM STOEBUCK & DALE WHITMAN, CONTEMPORARY PROPERTY
(1996).
68 See id. at 390-556.
69 See id. at 773-1032 (taken from a text written by two of the authors, GRANr NEI-
SON & DALE WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT CASES AND
MATERIALS (4th ed., 1992)).
70 BARLow BURKE, ANN BURKHART & R. H. HELMHOLZ, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROPERTY
LAW (1999).
71 3 Cai. R 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. 1805) (wild animal becomes the property of
the first person to capture or kill it), reproduced in BURKE, BURKHART & HELMHOLZ,
supra note 70.
72 The text does, however, have a section on exclusionary zoning, see BURKE, BURK-
HART & HELMHOLZ, supra note 70, at 916.
73 J. GORDON HYLTON, DAVID CALUiES, DANIEL MANDELKER & PAULA FRANZESE,
PROPERTY LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1998).
74 See id.at 3.
75 See id.at 701-56.
76 See id.at 617-50.
77 See id. at 28. See infra note 141, and accompanying text.
78 35 Mass. 193 (1836) (slave lawfully owned in Louisiana and brought to Massa-
chusetts could not be forcibly detained or taken back to Louisiana against her will),
reproduced in HYLTON, ET. AL., supra note 73, at 28.
2002]
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Professors Kurtz and Hovenkam79 present the law of marital
property in an interesting way in a chapter entitled, "Property and
Cohabitants."80 Further, they include a full chapter on housing dis-
crimination 8 ' and otherwise integrate similar useful materials
throughout.
The casebooks treat these issues in three different ways. Texts
that follow an integrated approach organize the cases and materi-
als along traditional property law lines, but include cases that
touch on human values issues. Professor Cribbet's text follows this
model. Others devote specific sections of the text to human values
issues. This sectional approach is embodied in Professor Singer's
text and Professor Chused's text. Finally, for some authors, human
values issues are marginal or peripheral to property and very few
cases dealing with such issues are included.82
The cases I use to introduce these concepts are presented be-
low, grouped by the themes of race and racism,83 environmental
racism or environmental justice,8 4 poverty and socio-economic sta-
tus, 85 gender, 6 sexual orientation and familial status,8 7 the differ-
ently abled a8 and the environment.89 In class, I track the order of
the text fairly closely. This approach, of course, yields a more co-
herent march through the law of property
II. DISCUSSION
The following are cases I use to teach traditional property law
doctrine, simultaneously demonstrating that property rights serve
human values. I am not advocating that every case mentioned nec-
essarily be taught. In some instances, it will be necessary to pick
and choose because of time constraints, or the professor may have
found a better case introducing the same concept. The cases are
presented as a possible roadmap only.
79 SHELDON KURTZ & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AMERICAN
PRoPERTY LAW (3d ed. 1999).
80 See id. at 358-426.
81 See id. at 941-88.
82 1 do not suggest that the authors of these texts deem human values unimpor-
tant, only that they apparently believe it appropriate to relegate discussion of them to
other courses.
83 See infra notes 90-180, and accompanying text.
84 See infra note 204, and accompanying text.
85 See infra notes 206-340, and accompanying text.
86 See infra notes 355-416, and accompanying text.
87 See infra note 426, and accompanying text.
88 See infra note 456, and accompanying text.




Because property is of such fundamental importance in soci-
ety from the perspectives of economic development, social ad-
vancement, and education it is not surprising that many of the
major cases in the history of race relations in this country involved
some aspect of real property law. I will discuss five cases that are
reasonably specific about race, but the list bears the constitutional
flaw of being both underinclusive and overinclusive. Further, the
order of presentation is based on the primary responsibility of
teaching property law and, thus, the cases are not presented in the
manner best suited to teaching from a civil rights or constitutional
law perspective.
1. State Action, Jones and Shelley
I include the first case in the introductory materials presented
in the first week. I begin the discussion of Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co.9°
with a very brief survey of the major civil rights acts and constitu-
tional amendments that preceded Jones,91 which the students are
probably seeing for the first time in a law school context. Thus, we
9o 392 U.S. 409 (1968), included in CRIBBET, supra note 12, at 46. For each case that
follows, I include reference to the type and depth of coverage each of the other men-
tioned fourteen texts give it. In some cases I note treatments of the case or issue that
warrant special mention, and in some instances I note cases that substitute for the
case I use. If a casebook is not mentioned, it can safely be assumed that the case or
topic is not covered therein. Although I have tried to be thorough in this regard, I
apologize in advance for any omissions; some of which may have been caused by va-
garies in the indexes of the texts but all of which are my responsibility. The case is
included in DUKEMINIER & KRiER, supra note 20, at 463 (note case only) and in
CASNER, ET AL, supra note 35, at 839. The Casner text includes a chapter on discrimi-
nation in housing that begins with a quote from DOUGLAS MASSEY AND NANCY DENTON,
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) and
then proceeds to Shelley v. Kraemer and then Jones. The text moves in a very coher-
ent fashion through private discrimination based on race, handicap, familiar status
marital status and sexual orientation. It is included in BRUCE & ELY, supra note 34, at
695; SINGER, supra note 48, at 131 (noted in the context of materials on the Public
Accommodation Statutes and Anti-discrimination Policy), and 960 (noted in materials
on "Fair Housing Law"). Also, it is included in HYLTON ET AL, supra note 73, at 611
(note case in discussion of racially restrictive covenants, following Shelley); CHUSED,
supra note 28, (noted at 502, 503, 1099); HYLTON, ET AL, supra note 74, at 611, 617-18
(note case only); and KURTZ & HOVENKAMP, supra note 79, at 953 (note case only).
91 Petitioner Jones filed a complaint alleging that the Alfred H. Mayer Company
had refused to sell him a home in the Paddock Woods community solely because he
was African American, see Jones, 392 U.S. at 412. However, the District Court dis-
missed the case, 255 F. Supp. 115 (D.C.Mo. 1966). The Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding that § 1982 only applies to state action and did not bar private discrimina-
tion, seeJones, 379 F.2d 33 (8"h Cir. 1967). The Supreme Court reversed, holding
both that § 1982 barred all discrimination, public and private, in the sale and rental
of housing and that the Act was a valid exercise of the power granted to Congress by
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first look at the Thirteenth Amendment,92 then the "Black
Codes,""3 the Civil Rights Act of 1866,14 which included current 42
USCA § 1982, 95 the Fourteenth Amendment, 96 and, finally, the
Civil Rights Act of 196897 and its component, the Fair Housing Act,
Title VIII. Such an approach leads to a discussion of the impor-
tance of property in society and the following quote from Justice
Stewart:
Just as the Black Codes, enacted after the Civil War to restrict
the free exercise of those rights, were substitutes for the slave
system, so the exclusion of Negroes from white communities be-
came a substitute for the Black Codes. And when racial discrimi-
nation herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy
property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of
slavery.
9 8
At this point, I reserve a more detailed analysis of the debate9 9 as to
whether the Act was aimed at private conduct and whether the pas-
sage of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 should have prompted the
Court to decline further consideration of Jones.100
I begin the discussion of Shelley v. Kraemer' by reminding the
the Thirteenth Amendment, see Jones, 392 U.S. at 413. Thus, the Court did not reach
the Equal Protection Clause argument, seeJones, 392 U.S. at 413, n. 5.
92 U.S. CONST. Amend. XIII (1865).
93 The Black Codes were Southern states' laws which, "saddled Negroes with 'oner-
ous disabilities and burdens, and curtailed their ights *** to such an extent that their
freedom was of little value ***'." Jones, 392 U.S. at 426,) (quoting Slaughter-House
Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1873)).
94 Act of April 9, 1866, c. 31, s. 1, 14 Stat. 27, re-enacted by sec. 18 of the Enforce-
ment Act of 1870, Act of May 31, 1870, c. 114, s. 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144, and codified at
sec. 1977 and 1978 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, now 42 U.S.C. §§. 1981 and 1982.
95 "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1982.
96 U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV (1868). I explain briefly that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was enacted, in part, to assure the constitutionality of the 1866 Act. SeeJones,
392 U.S. at 436. See also Keith Sealing, The Myth of a Colorblind Constitution, 57 WASH.
U.J. OF URBAN & CoNTEMP. L. 157, 163-64 (1999).
97 Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81. The 1968 Act was passed after the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit held that section 1982 only applied to state action and did not
cover private refusals to sell to minorities. The Court stated that the enactment of the
1968 Act had no effect on section 1982 or the case at hand. SeeJones, 392 U.S. at 416-
417.
98 Jones, 392 U.S. at 442-43. It is also instructive to excerpt from Justice Douglas's
extensive quote from Frederick Douglass. See id. at 446 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Fredrick Douglass, The Color Line, The North American Review, June 1881, 4 THE
LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDR.cK DOUGLASS 343-44 (1955).
99 SeeJones, 392 U.S. at 420-37; see also id. at 452-76 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
10 See id. at 476-80 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
101 334 U.S. 1 (1948), included in CRIBBET supra note 12, at 83; DUKEMINIER &
KRIFR, supra note 20, at 905-10; CASNER, ET AL, supra note 35, at 830; BERGER & WiL-
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students that Jones involved strictly the private action of an individ-
ual found to be in violation of 42 USCA § 1982, which was, in turn,
found to be unconstitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment.
By contrast, Shelley involved a restrictive covenant requiring en-
forcement through state action, triggering the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Equal Protection Clause. °'0 2
I then walk the students through the Court's carefully ordered
reasoning, noting its emphasis on the importance of property in
the context of civil rights.10 3 First, the Court observed that it faced
a case of first impression, the applicability of the Fourteenth
Amendment to state courts' enforcement of racially restrictive coV-
LIAMS, supra note 38, at 145 (note case pointing out that the case's "'state action'
theory has been much criticized even by scholars sympathetic with [it]," citing Louis
Henkin, Shelle
, 
v. Kraemer Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473, 622
(1962) (in a seven-page treatment of racially restrictive covenants, which includes a
copy of a racially restrictive deed and a magazine advertisement depicting a new com-
munity of "'The Right Sort of Neighbors,' Achieved by Selling to 'Approved Purchas-
ers' under 'Rigid Conditions'"), and 738 (noting that Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, and Presidents George Bush and John F. Kennedy had been criticized for
owning homes subject to racially restrictive covenants). Also, included in BRUCE &
ELY, supra note 34, at 688 (with some notes following, but suggesting that "[t]he full
implications of Shelley v. Kraemer are best left explored in another course."); SINGER,
supra note 48, at 493-99, including a photograph of the Shelley family, which the text
follows with Evans v. Abney, discussed infra note 119, and accompanying text; DWYER
& MENNELL, supra note 57 (note case only at 771, 866, 868, 879); JOHNSON, ET AL,
supra note 64, at 709, 751 (note case only); NELSON, ET AL, supra note 67, at 671 (note
case only); HYLTON ET AL, supra note 73, at 603; included in CHUSED, supra note 28, at
445. Professor Chused presents Corrigan v. Buckley, 299 F. 899, affd. 271 U.S. 323
(1924) (restrictive racial covenant upheld under "separate but equal" theory); see also
KURTZ & HOVENKAMP, supra note 79, at 942 (as the first case in a chapter on housing
discrimination).
102 Shelley involved two consolidated cases. The first, Kraemer v. Shelley, 198
S.W.2d 679 (Mo. 1946), involved a restrictive covenant in St. Louis, Missouri that re-
quired that owners only sell to white buyers. The Shelleys, African Americans, pur-
chased the property in violation of the covenants, and other property owners brought
suit to try to prevent them from taking possession and divesting them of title. Despite
the facts that owners of only forty-seven of the fifty-seven parcels in the subdivision
had signed the covenants, that one parcel had been occupied by African Americans
since 1882, thirty years before the covenants were signed, and that four African Amer-
ican families lived in the subdivision at the time of the suit, see Shelley, 334 U.S. at 5,
the Supreme Court of Missouri held for the plaintiffs, reversing the trial court. The
second case, from Michigan, involved a similar fact pattern of mutual covenants re-
stricting ownership and occupancy to whites. When an African American family ac-
quired title to a parcel and occupied it, other homeowners sued and the trial court
entered a decree ordering the African-American family to move out within ninety
days. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed. See Sipes v. McGhee, 25 N.W.2d 638.
103 The Court stated, "[i]t cannot be doubted that among the civil rights intended
to be protected from discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth Amendment are
the rights to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of property." Shelley, 334 U.S. at 10.
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enants. 1°4 The Court then stated that restrictive covenants would
clearly be violative of the Fourteenth Amendment if imposed by
state statutes or local ordinances.'1 5 But, the Court noted the re-
strictions in Shelley were created by agreements among private indi-
viduals, and the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect against
discriminatory or wrongful private conduct. 10 6 "But here there is
more," the Court stated, and proceeded to demonstrate that the
purpose of the agreements can only be effectuated by judicial en-
forcement in state courts.'0 7 After demonstrating that judicial ac-
tion is clearly state action,'0 8 the Court used evocative words - "full
panoply of state power" and "full coercive power of government ' '
- and concluded that the African-American petitioners had been
denied the equal protection of the laws.110
The Casner text asks, "[c]ould privately created racial cove-
nants have been outlawed on the grounds of public policy rather
than by stretching the concept of state action to fit them under the
1 4th Amendment?"11  The answer was "probably not" at the time.
However, "[t]oday, it is likely that racially restrictive covenants
would be held to violate public policy under the common law in
most states."'
12
There are a number of future interest cases that can illustrate
racial discrimination. Professor Cribbett uses Capitol Federal Savings
v. Smith,"' which is intended to illustrate a technical point regard-
ing how a shift automatically occurs where the condition of an ex-
104 See id. at 8.
105 See id. at 11.
106 See id. at 13.
107 See id. at 13-4.
108 See id. at 15-8.
109 See id. at 19
110 See id. at 20.
111 CASNER, ET AL, supra note 35, at 837, n. 2. A Canadian case that did just that is
excerpted. See id., (citing Re Drummond Wren, [1945] O.R. 778, 4 D. L. R. 674). As
noted above, supra note 101, the Berger and Williams text notes the same issue. See
BERGER & WILIuAMS, supra note 38. See also Shelley Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer's Fiftieth
Anniversary: 'A Time for Keeping; a Time for Throwing Away'? 47 U. KAN. L. REv. 61
(1998).
112 SINGER, supra note 48, at 508. Professor Singer devotes several pages to this
issue, including useful references to some of the many articles on point. Id. at 508-11.
113 316 P.2d 252 (Co. 1957), included in CRIBBET, supra note 12, at 46; BERGER &
WILLIAMS, supra note 38, at 146 (note case only, but including the quote I reproduce
at note 118 and accompanying text); BRUCE & ELY, supra note 34, at 694 (mentioned
briefly in a note following Shelley v. Kraemer); SINGER, supra note 48, at 628-29 (note
case). Professor Singer also includes Charlotte Park and Recreation Commission v.
Barringer, 88 S.E.2d 114 (N.C. 1955), which reached the opposite conclusion. Id. at




ecutory limitation has been violated. If a professor follows
Cribbet's sequencing faithfully, students will have already become
familiar with Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co.,1 14 and, more on point, Shelley
v. Kramer. 1
5
In Capitol Federal, a group of landowners signed covenants
which provided that if any of them sold property to "colored per-
sons" the title would be forfeited and the land would go to the rest
of the owners in the subdivision.' 6 It could be argued that this was
a fee simple subject to an executory limitation with an executory
interest (shifting use), which is, indeed, the primary point of the
case in the context of the subject of defeasible fees and future in-
terests. If this automatic shift was not state action, then the rule
from Shelley v. Kraemer should not apply and the restrictive cove-
nant should stand.11 7 The Court's response is perhaps less legal
than provocative of discussion, "[hiigh-sounding phrases or out-
moded common-law terms cannot alter the effect of the agreement
embraced in the instant case."" 8
However, two other cases are very useful; I would suggest using
at least one or the other. First, Evans v. Abney' 19 was the last in a
series of cases resulting from a conveyance in the 1911 will of Geor-
114 Discussed supra note 90-100, and accompanying text.
115 Discussed supra note 101-12, and accompanying text.
116 Capitol Federal, 316 P.2d at 253. Plaintiffs were African Americans who had
purchased land in the subdivision and sought a declaratory judgment that the agree-
ment was void and, thus, the cloud on their title that it created should be removed.
Defendants counter-claimed by asserting title to the properties in question. The trial
court issued a declaratory judgment holding that the plaintiffs were owners in fee
simple and clearing their titles, finding that enforcement of the clause would be viola-
tive of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the defend-
ants appealed. See id. at 253-54.
117 In fact, defendants argued that Shelley v. Kraemer did not apply because that
case involved a restrictive covenant rather than an automatic forfeiture and a future
interest. See Capitol Federal, 316 P.2d at 254.
118 Capitol Federal, 316 P.2d at 255. The court continued, "[w]hile the hands may
seem to be the hands of Esau to a blind Isaac, the voice is by astute counsel, it is still a
racial restriction judicial approval or blessing to a contract such as is here involved."
See Genesis 27:1-30 (Blind Isaac told his oldest son Esau that if he hunted game and
prepared it as a feast for him he would bless him. After Esau departed for the hunt,
Rebekah, Isaac's wife and Esau's mother, who had overheard the conversation called
upon the younger son, Jacob, whom she favored over Esau, and told him to kill kids
from his flock, prepare a feast and disguise himself as Esau. Jacob did so. When Isaac
sought assurance that it was Esau before him, hairless Jacob presented his hand, cov-
ered with an animal skin, as the "hands of [hirsute] Esau." Thereupon, Isaac be-
stowed the blessing intended for Esau upon Jacob).
119 396 U.S. 435 (1970). Included in CRIBBET, supra note 12, at 46; CASNr_, ET AL,
supra note 35 at 839; BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 38; BRUCE & ELY, supra note 34 at
695; SINGER, supra note 48, at 499-508; DWYER & MENNELL, supra note 57;JoHNSON, ET
AL, supra note 64; CHUSED, supra note 28, at 361 (most extensive coverage).
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gia's United States Senator A. 0. Bacon. Bacon conveyed land in
trust to the city of Macon, Georgia to be used as a public park for
whites only. In 1966, the Court held that the park could no longer
be used for whites only.12° The Georgia Supreme Court then re-
fused to apply the doctrine of cy pres to continue to operate the
land as a park but as an integrated park and instead terminated the
trust and allowed the land to revert to Bacon's heirs.12' In the final
case, although "disheartened,"122 the court majority's held that the
state's highest court had correctly applied Georgia's trust law, find-
ing Shelley "easily distinguishable."123 Writing in dissent, Justice
Brennan argued that, "[n]o record could present a clearer case of
the closing of a public facility for the sole reason that the public
authority that owns and maintains it cannot keep it segregated." 124
Further, Brennan argued that Shelley applied.'
Second, in Charlotte Park and Recreation Commission v. Bar-
ringer,"' Osmond Barringer and others conveyed land to the Char-
lotte Park and Recreation Commission to form Revolution Park.
However, the Barringer deed contained the restriction that the
land was to be "used and enjoyed by members of the white race
only."127 Moreover, if that restriction were violated, the deed pro-
vided that the land would automatically revert to Barringer, with an
imposed fee of $3,500.12 When a group of African-Americans peti-
120 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
121 Evans v. Newton, 148 S.E. 2d 329, 330 (Ga. 1966).
122 Evans, 396 U.S. 435, 443-44.
123 Id. at 445. The Court stated that Shelley had involved state-supported discrimi-
nation against African-Americans, whereas closing the park hurt both whites and Afri-
can-Americans.
124 Id. at 452 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125 See id. at 456-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126 88 S.E.2d 114 (N.C. 1955), cert. denied; Leeper v. Charlotte Park & Recreation
Commission, 350 U.S. 983 (1956). Included in CRIIBET, supra note 12, at 46; HYLTON,
ET AL, supra note 73, at 611 (note case only, noting that correctness of the decision is
"still at matter of debate."). As noted above, CHusED, supra note 28, at 350-58 con-
tains the most detailed discussion of the case. Included in CASNER, ET AL, supra note
35, at 839; BRUCE & ELY, supra note 34, at 694-95 (note case only); SINGER, supra note
48, at 627-28 (note case only); DWYER & MENNELL, supra note 57; included in CHUSED,
supra note 28, at 352 (most extensive coverage); HYLTON, ET AL, supra note 74, at 611
(note case only); KuRTZ & HOVENKAMP, supra note 79, at 947 (note case only).
127 Charlotte Park & Recreation Comm'n, 88 S.E.2d at 122.
128 See id. This restriction raises an issue that makes the case a great property case
regardless of the social issues presented. The court goes out of its way to find that the
deed creates a fee simple determinable estate, which automatically reverts to the gran-
tor, rather than a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, which requires that
the grantor take action to reenter and retake the estate and would probably require
state action. Thus, the court can state that, "[t]he operation of this reversion provi-
sion is not by any judicial enforcement by the State Courts of North Carolina, and
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tioned to use the golf course in the park, the commission sought a
declaratory judgment to determine would happen to the land if it
allowed minorities to use it. 12 9 After exhaustive review of the case
law regarding fee simple determinable estates,1 30 the court con-
cluded that such an interest had been created and stated that, " [i] t
is a distinct characteristic of a fee determinable upon limitation
that the estate automatically reverts at once on the occurrence of
the event by which it is limited."' 3 ' Because the reversion was auto-
matic, the court concluded that Shelley v. Kraemer "has no applica-
tion."13 2 With one eye firmly on Shelley, the Court apparently was
able to keep the other on Brown v. Board of Education (I),"' decided
just the year before, stating:
We know of no law that prohibits a white man from conveying a
fee determinable upon the limitation that it shall not be used by
members of any race except his own, nor of any law that prohib-
its a negro'3 4 from conveying a fee determinable upon the limi-
tation that it shall not be used by members of any race, except
his own.' 3 5
Thus, the Court concluded, a holding that the fee would not revert
to Barringer if the golf course were used by African-Americans
would be a taking without adequate compensation under the Fifth
Amendment.136
2. Native American Issues
The casebooks take a variety of approaches to the inclusion of
Native American law. For example, Professor Singer includes an
entire section on federal Indian law.1 37 Professor Chused is also
Shelly v. Kraemer [334 U.S. 1 (1948)] has no application." See id. at 123. But, is it
really a fee simple determinable rather than a fee simple subject to a condition subse-
quent if Barringer had to pay to get his reversion? See CHUSED, supra note 28, at 358.
Arguing to the contrary, does making a payment to the commission constitute state
action? Perhaps the court did not want to take the chance.
129 Charlotte Park & Recreation Comm'n, 88 S.E.2d at 119.
130 See id. at 120-22 (citing cases from Connecticut, Massachusetts, Missouri, Ver-
mont, Tennessee, Oregon, Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Ohio and New
Hampshire).
131 Id. at 122 (emphasis added).
132 Id. at 123.
133 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (abolishing the doctrine of "separate but equal" in public
education).
134 The lack of capitalization is in the original.
135 Charlotte Park & Recreation Comm'n, 88 S.E.2d at 119.
136 U. S. CONST. Amend. V. (1791).
1-37 See SINGER, supra note 48, at 1183-2000; including United States v. Sioux Nation
of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). HYLTON, CALIES, MANDELER & FRANZESE, supra note
73, makes only a brief mention of such rights but does cite to Mabo v. State of Queen-
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very strong on Native American issues. 13 8  Others have no cases
whatsoever or only Johnson v. M'Intosh. As many schools offer a sep-
arate course in Native American Law, it appears that time restric-
tions limit coverage of this area.13 9
a. Power and Appropriation
I use Johnson v. M'Intosh14 ° in my International Law classes and
in a seminar I have taught from time to time entitled "Law and
Social Problems," because Chief Justice Marshall, for whatever rea-
sons, so blatantly and unflinchingly lays out the racist and impe-
rialist assumptions of his era.14 2
sland, 107 A.L.R. 1 (1992) (reversing Australia's traditional rejection of aboriginal
claim of rights to lands occupied when Europeans arrived).
138 See CHUSED, supra note 28, at 6-78 (§ 1.03 Early Native American Land Claim
Cases; § 1.04 Contemporary Consequences of the Dawes Act Era), 101 (Indian Land
and Adverse Possession; Tribal Artifacts).
139 See, e.g., Native American Law in SYRACUSE UNFVCERSI COLLEGE OF LAw CATALOG
1999-2000 at 15.
140 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). Included in CRIBBET, supra note 12, at 46;
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 20, at 3-10; RABIN, KwALL & KWALL, supra note 31, at
789 (brief mention in footnote); CASNER, ET AL, supra note 35, at 839; BERGER & WI-
LIAMS, supra note 38, at 25, 27 (note case only); BRUCE & ELY, supra note 34, at 695;
SINGER, supra note 48, at 4-15; DwYER & MENNELL, supra note 57, at 69; JOHNSON, ET
AL, supra note 64, at 2; CHUSED, supra note 28, at 8; HYLTON, ET AL, supra note 74, at 28
(note case only, with brief comment on aboriginal property rights); KURTZ &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 79, at 68.
141 See infra note 158-65, and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Mar-
shall's intent.
142 In non-property courses, it is more appropriate to spend additional time on a
comparative law treatment of the property rights of various indigenous peoples. Be-
cause of personal interests and the availability of materials, I compare the American
and Australian experiences. See John Skinner, Native People, Foreign Laws: A Survey
Comparing Aboriginal Title to Property in the United States and Alaska, 19 SUFFOLK TRANS-
NAT'L L. REv. 235 (1995) (arguing that both the United States and Alaska should
enact legislation to place tide of traditional aboriginal lands back in the hands of
indigenous populations); Beth Ganz, Indigenous Peoples and Land Tenure: An Issue of
Human Rights and Environmental Protection, 9 GEO INT'L ENVrL. L. REV. 173 (1996)
(arguing for the creation of a permanent framework by which to recognize indige-
nous land rights); Karen E. Bravo, Balancing Indigenous Rights to Land and the Demands
of Economic Development: Lessons From the United States and Australia, 30 COLuM. J.L. &
Soc. PROBS. 529 (1997) (arguing for the formulation of fundamental criteria that
must be fulfilled in order to assure the protection of indigenous rights); Gilda C.
Rodriguez, Wik Peoples v. State of Queensland: A Restrained Expansion of Aboriginal Land
Rights, 23 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 711 (1998) (arguing that the Australian High
Court's holding that native title can co-exist with a pastoral interest may have far-
reaching consequences because of the large percentage of pastoral lands in Austra-
lia); Geoffrey Robert Schiveley, Negotiation and Native Title: Why Common Law Courts are
not Proper Fora for Determining Native Land Title Issues, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 427
(2000) (explaining why the common law court system is an inadequate forum for
determining native rights and arguing for negotiation as an alternative to litigation).
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The case arose because the plaintiffs claimed title to the land
based on two grants made by Indian'43 chiefs. 44 Indians were in
possession of the land at the time of the conveyance. The facts are
fairly straightforward and the issue is clear-cut: did Indians have
power to give title that can be recognized in United States courts?
A springboard for discussion of the ultimate basis of rights to land
in the Anglo-American system, as flowing from William the Con-
queror,145 the case also contrasts the European concept of property
with the indigenous view of property.'46 I concentrate on Mar-
shall's opinion, which speaks for itself:
On the discovery of this immense continent, the great nations of
Europe were eager to appropriate to themselves so much of it as
they could respectively acquire. Its vast extent offered an ample
field to the ambition and enterprise of all; and the character
and religion of its inhabitants afforded an apology for consider-
ing them as a people over whom the superior genius of Europe
might claim an ascendancy. The potentates of the old world
found no difficulty in convincing themselves that they made am-
ple compensation to the inhabitants of the new, by bestowing on
them civilization and Christianity, in exchange for unlimited in-
dependence. But, as they were all in pursuit of nearly the same
object, it was necessary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements,
and consequent war with each other, to establish a principle,
which all should acknowledge as the law by which the right of
acquisition, which they all asserted, should be regulated as be-
tween themselves. This principle was, that discovery gave title to
the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was
made, against all other European governments, which title
might be consummated by possession.
147
Justice Marshall then states that the rights of the inhabitants were
thereafter not "entirely disregarded" but rather were "to a consid-
143 For a discussion of the propriety of the term "Indian" versus "Native American,"
see JA Es WILSON, THE EARTH SHALL WEEP A HISTORY OF NATIVE AMErICA (1998) xv
(discussing the difficulties in arriving at the proper terms for use in describing the
indigenous peoples of North America).
144 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 571-72.
145 SeeWILLIAM STROEBUCK & DALE WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY (3d ed. 2000)
14-16.
146 Wilson, supra note 145, at 23-24 notes that:
Most groups - hunters and plant-gatherers as well as agriculturists -
viewed land as a common resource rather than a commodity that could
be owned. Tribes and families had the right to hunt, fish or grow crops
in defined places, but the concept of a fenced-off parcel of land being
the exclusive property of an individual would have been utterly alien to
most, if not all, Native Americans.
147 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 572-73.
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erable extent, impaired."'48 Declining to consider the "abstract
principles" of whether an industrialized society has the right to ex-
pel hunters from their land, Justice Marshall states, "[t] he title by
conquest is acquired and maintained by force."149 Having ac-
quired titled, the conqured can normally be blended in to the con-
quering race (one presumes, if they are of the same race) or can be
governed as a distinct people. 50 However, such was not possible
with the Indians:
But the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce
savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was
drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of
their country, was to leave the country a wilderness; to govern
them as a distinct people, was impossible, because they were as
brave and as high spirited as they were fierce, and were ready to
repel by arms every attempt on their independence. What was
the inevitable consequence of this state of things? The Europe-
ans were under the necessity either of abandoning the country,
and relinquishing their pompous claims to it, or of enforcing
those claims by the sword, and by the adoption of principles
adapted to the condition of a people with whom it was impossi-
ble to mix, and who could not be governed as a distinct society,
or of remaining in their neighbourhood, and exposing them-
selves and their families to the perpetual hazard of being
massacred. 1 5 1
In the fifteen casebooks surveyed, Johnson v. M'Intosh is given a
wide range of coverages. A few mention it briefly or not at all.
Others include it as a major case, and several make it the first case
in the book.152 The Dukeminier, Casner andJohnson texts, in par-
ticular, have excellent notes and comments. The various texts in-
troduce two interesting lines of discussion. First, how did the white
148 Id. at 574. There, Marshall stated:
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabi-
tants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to
a considerable extent, impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful
occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain posses-
sion of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their
rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily
diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to
whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental prin-
ciple, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.
149 Id. at 589.
150 See id. at 589-90.
151 Id. at 590.




conquerors justify taking land that was already inhabited? Second,
what were the unvoiced reasons for Marshall's opinion?
As to the former, Dukeminier and Krier first discuss the con-
cepts of acquisition of land by discovery or conquest. Noting that
acquisition by conquest has now been proscribed by international
law, the law of the time allowed the first "discoverer" to deal as he
saw fit with any existing populations. But, how could one discover
land that was already occupied? According to Dukeminier and
Krier, "It]he answer is discomfiting. During the so-called classical
era of discovery (1450-1600), prior possession by aboriginal popu-
lations (which were sometimes called savage populations, or semi-
civilized ones) was commonly thought not to matter. "
15
3
Dukeminier and Krier next discuss the influence of John Locke's
labor theory on the European belief that Indians had not invested
enough labor to perfect a property interest in the land, thus al-
lowing Europeans to claim the land "by righteous reference to
their own ethnocentric conception of what amounted to actual
possession."1
54
Professor Casner presents the recent scholarship of Professor
Kades, which includes the following quote from President James
Monroe:
The hunter or savage state requires a greater extent of territory
to sustain it than is compatible with the progress and just claims
of civilized life, and must yield to it.
The earth was given to mankind to support the greatest number
of which it is capable, and no tribe or people have the right to
withhold from the wants of others more than is necessary for
their own support and comfort.
155
Professor Johnson's discussion of the case quotes John Quincy
Adams, who asked, "[s]hall [the Native American] forbid the wil-
derness to blossom like the rose? Shall he forbid the oaks of the
forest to fall before the axe of industry and rise again transformed
into the habitations of ease and elegance?" He juxtaposes these
words with the statements of Chief Seattle of the Duwanish Indians:
"The Great Chief in Washington send word that he wishes to buy
our land. How can you buy or sell the sky - the warmth of the
land? The idea is strange to us." The text also presents the theory
that dispossession of the Indians was justified by the "nomad myth"
153 DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 20, at 12.
154 DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 20, at 16-17.
155 CASNER, ET. AL, supra note 35, at 101 (quoting Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Effi-
ciency: Johnson v. M'Intosh and the Expropriation of Indian Lands, 148 U. PENN. L. REv.
1065 (2000)).
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derived from the English colonization of Ireland in the sixteenth
century. 56 It also relates the origins of the right of conquest ideol-
ogy, placing it as a derivation of the Christian European legal tradi-
tion of cultural racism and discrimination against non-Christians
dating back to the Crusades. 157
As to Marshall's motivation for wording his opinion so
strongly, Professors Dukeminier and Krier state that Marshall's
"sarcasm and irony" are caused by embarrassment about what he
had to write and that he was sympathetic to the plight of Native
Americans. 158 The Casner text argues that, "[M]arshall sought to
maintain the Court's constitutional powers while protecting some
property rights of the Indians."159 The Berger text states that,
"[o]ne way of readingJohnson v. M'ntosh is as an attempt to protect
Native Americans by making it impossible for whites to 'buy' land
in sales in which whites often took advantage of Indians, rather
than as a statement of the limited nature of their property
rights."' 60 Professor Johnson places the case in the context of
Chief Justice Marshall's political struggle over the place and pres-
tige of the Supreme Court. According to him, Johnson, along with
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,16 1 and Worcester v. Georgia,'6 2 carved out
Supreme Court "turf" in much the same way as Marbury v.
Madison,65 but also provided Indians with the "necessary legal
space" to begin their own economic development. 64 Finally, Pro-
fessor Chused suggests that Marshall arguably "tried to exercise a
paternalistic sense of responsibility" toward those tribes willing to
peacefully cede land.1 6 5
Professors Dukeminier and Krier also use the case to provide
156 CASNER ET. AL., supra note 35, at 11-2 (citing William Bassett, The Myth of the
Nomad in Property Law, 4J. OF LAw & RELIGION 133 (1986)).
157 SeeJOHNSON, ET AL, supra note 64, at 12 (citing Robert Williams, Columbus' legacy:
The Rehnquist Court's Perpetuation of European Cultural racism Against American Indian
Tribes, 39 FED. B. NEWS &J. 358 (1992)); see also ROBERT WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN
INDIAN IN WEsTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DIscouRsEs OF CONQUEST (1990).
158 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 20, at 12, n. 5.
159 See CASNER ET. AL., supra note 35, at 101, n. 1.
160 See BERGER & WILLAMS, supra note 38, at 27.
161 30 U.S. 1 (1831) (Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, not original juris-
diction over disputes between the State of Georgia and Cherokees). See also CHUSED,
supra note 28, at 23.
162 31 U.S. 515 (1832) (federal government, not the states, has jurisdiction over
Indian tribes). See CHUSED, supra note 28, at 36.
163 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
164 SeeJOHNSON, ET AL, supra note 64, at 14-5 (citing David Getches, Conquering the
Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L.
REv. 1573 (1996)).
165 See CHUSED, supra note 28, at 19.
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an introduction to Critical Legal Studies and Critical Race Theory
and provide excellent additional source material for students seek-
ing additional information on these concepts. 16
I ask my students to consider whether the attitudes expressed
in Johnson v. M'Intosh are mere relics by introducing the following:
"[a] superior culture expands, by trade or cultural imperialism or
conquest or all of the above, and will find its tenets embraced by
the erstwhile captives even when the era of expansion is over.
" 1 6 1
By raising these issues, I go far outside the scope of property to a
discussion of cultural clashes, often concluding by recommending
Jared Diamond's Pulizer Prize winning book, Guns, Germs and Steel
The Fates of Human Societies, a a source that repudicates the view of
cultural superiority expressed above and in many tracts that ration-
alize the origins of American property rights.'
Some casebooks include one or more modem cases on Native
American issues; for example, Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States"9
and Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Na-
tion.170 Other Indian issues include American Indian remains, as
described in Wana the Bear v. Community Construction, Inc.171 and
cultural objects, as discussed in Charrier v. Bell.172
3. Discriminatory Zoning
The "important and celebrated" 7 3 case of Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.174 illustrates two
166 DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 20, at 8, n. 7.
167 WiLLIAM A. HENRY III, IN DEFENSE OF ELMSM 31 (1994) (describing what he
considers to be the seven criteria of a superior culture).
168 JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS AND STEEL THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES
(1998). Diamond's Pulitzer Prize-winning book describes how coincidences of geog-
raphy and the distribution of cultivatable grains and domesticable animals - as op-
posed to racial superiority - led to geographic expansion and the conquest of some
groups by other groups.
169 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
170 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
171 180 Cal. Rptr. 423 (Ct. App. 1982).
172 496 So. 2d 601 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
173 Metropolitan Development Corp. v. City of Arlington Heights, 469 F. Supp 836,
841.
174 429 U.S. 252 (1977), included in CRIBBET supra note 12, at 901; RA1N, KWALL &
KWALL, supra note 31, at 702 (principal case following problem assignment); CASNER,
ET. AL., supra note 35, at 1251 (long note case following Cleburne Living Center);
BERGER & WILIAMS, supra note 38, at 739 (note case); BRUCE & ELY, supra note 34, at
867; SINGER, supra note 48, at 1004-05 (note case following Huntington Branch
NAACP); DwYER & MENNELL, supra note 57, at 980 (note case in a section on exclu-
sionary zoning); NELSON, ET AL, supra note 67, at 1098 (note case only), BuRKE, BU.K-
HART & HELMHOLZ, supra note 70, at 917, included in HYLTON, supra note 73, at 180.
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very difficult concepts: first, the difficulty in proving that a govern-
ment entity's housing decision was racially motivated, even where
racial impact can be much more easily shown, and second, the very
real clash between the legitimate desire to maintain property val-
ues and the need to provide low-income housing.175
Why did Arlington Heights, a well-to-do Chicago suburb of
63,973 whites and twenty-seven African-Americans 76 decline to al-
low a zoning change that would have significantly increased the
number of minorities in the Village?' 77 If students are too quick to
conclude that racism was at work here, I ask them whether the Vil-
lage would have objected to an all-white low income housing pro-
ject. Is it not true that low-income, high-density housing situated
next to low-density expensive homes will lower the value of those
homes, apart from any issue of race? Is it not true that the existing
homeowners had a legitimate expectation interest in continued
low-density construction? 1 78  It can be quickly established that
there are no easy answers here. Once it is agreed that there are
always legitimate reasons to oppose low income housing, the ques-
tion is asked: absent some foolish admission of racial animus, are
not local municipalities always shielded from Equal Protection
problems in zoning decisions, since they can always show non-ra-
cial property-values-based reasons for their denials? In other
words, is the Equal Protection Clause rendered toothless in the
zoning context by this decision?
This issue leads to a discussion of whether the Fair Housing
Act is a more useful weapon in this context. Ultimately, the Court
remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider the question of
whether the Fair Housing Act had been violated, but although the
Court of Appeals held that it had, the parties' settlement left the
175 The Court held that the Equal Protection Clause required a showing of racial
intent, not racial impact alone.
176 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 255.
177 In 1971, the Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation ("MHDC") ap-
plied for a zoning change in order to build a 190-unit low and moderate-income
housing project. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 257-58. It was clear to Village
officials and residents that the development would be racially integrated. Id. at 257.
At three public hearings on the rezoning request the "social issue" of integration was
raised, as were other non-racial concerns. Id. at 257-58. The District Court found that
the denial was not motivated by racial discrimination but rather by the desire to pre-
serve property values and dismissed the suit. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp. v. City of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Ill. 1974). The Court of
Appeals reversed on a finding of discriminatory effect. Metropolitan Housing Devel-
opment Corp. v. City of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7a' Cir. 1975).
178 SeeArlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270.
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final answer undetermined. '79 There is ample additional discus-
sion available to students who wish to look further into the case.1 80
4. Slaves as Property
A number of texts discuss the topic (obviously no longer di-
rectly relevant) of slaves as property.' 1' Doing so in the context of
an initial exploration of the question, "What is property?" is an ex-
cellent way to infuse an important early topic in property law with
social relevance. Professor Chused includes Dred Scott v. Sanford1 82
in a chapter on "Autonomy and Community: Property in Human
Beings." 183
B. Environmental Justice
"Real property lawyers must become experts in both state and
federal environmental law.' 84 Nevertheless, the casebooks take a
widely varied approach to the subjects of environmental law in gen-
eral and the emerging discipline of environmental justice or envi-
ronmental racism in particular. Only Professor Cribbet has a
section on environmental justice per se.' 85 Twelve pages are devoted
to the topic, including two cases-in-chief: Bean v. Southwestern Waste
179 See id. at 566-67. On remand, the Court of Appeals reiterated its finding that the
Village could not ignore the discriminatory effect of its decision and remanded to the
District Court. See Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. City of Arlington
Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7 Cir. 1977). Upon remand, the parties negotiated an alter-
native plan to build a low and moderate income housing development near to but
outside the city limits of the village and asked the District Court to approve the settle-
ment, which it did. See Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. City of Arlington
Heights, 469 F. Supp. 836 (N.D.Ill. 1979). Finally, the Court of Appeals approved the
settlement. See Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. City of Arlington
Heights, 616 F.2d 1006 (7' Cir. 1980).
180 See, e.g., Daniel Mandelker, Racial Discrimination and Exclusionary Zoning: A Per-
spective on Arlington Heights, 55 TEX. L. REv. 1217 (1977) (arguing that the federal
courts should not expansively read the Fourteenth Amendment to require a whole-
sale review of exclusionary zoning practices absent proof of discriminatory intent);
Robert G. Schwemm, From Washington To Arlington Heights And Beyond: Discriminatory
Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U.L.L. FORUM 961 (1977); Comment, Proof
of Racially Discriminatory Purpose Under the Equal Protection Clause: Washington v. Davis,
Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy And Williamsburg, 12 HLv. C. R.C. L. L.REv. 725 (1977)
(surveying court decisions in the area), all cited in Metropolitan Development Corp.
v. City of Arlington Heights, 469 F. Supp at 842, n. 1.
181 See, e.g., HYLTON, supra note 73, at 28, discussing the case of Commonwealth v.
Aves, 35 Mass. 193 (1836) (Louisiana child slave, brought to Massachusetts by her
owner, not considered property in Massachusetts and, thus removed from owner and
placed in court-ordered custody).
182 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
183 CHUSED, supra note 28, at 1075-188.
184 SINGER, supra note 48, at 1075.
185 CRIBBET, supra note 12, at 931-43.
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Management Corp.18 and Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670
v. Damian."7 Both, although only District Court-level cases, have
been the topic of a good deal of discussion.18
In Bean, the court was faced with the issue of whether the
placement of a solid waste disposal facility 1700 feet from an un-air
conditioned, predominantly African-American high school was ra-
cially motivated and, thus, whether the plaintiffs had a substantial
likelihood of showing the placement to be in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983."9 The facts in Bean demonstrate the difficulty of proving
intent, particularly in a case that included statistical evidence. The
court notes that an almost identical application for a waste treat-
ment plant was denied in 1971 when the adjacent school was
predominantly white but was granted in 1979 after the school had
become primarily African-American. 90  However, following a
lengthy consideration of the statistical evidence put together by the
parties, the court is not sufficiently persuaded to allow the case to
go forward.' 9 ' But, the court appears quite skeptical of the defend-
ants' motivations, even going so far as to state, " [i]f this court were
[the Texas Department of Health], it might very well have denied
this permit. It simply does not make sense to put a solid waste site
so close to a high school, particularly one with no air conditioning.
Nor does it make sense to put a land site so close to a residential
neighborhood." 92 But, this court concludes that the Supreme
Court's holding in Village of Arlington Heights precluded it from of-
fering the plaintiffs even the opportunity of going forward and
proving their case with the protection of a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction. 193
186 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979). This case is not included in any of the other
texts, which, as noted, do not have sections devoted to environmental justice or envi-
ronmental racism.
187 608 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Ohio 1984). Included in CRIBBET at 931, but, as dis-
cussed, not included in any other texts.
188 Bean has been at least mentioned in approximately 140 law review articles, and
Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 in at least thirty-six.
189 482 F. Supp at 674-75. The plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction when the Texas Department of Health granted Southwestern
Waste Management a permit to build a solid waste facility in Harris County. See id.
The court denied defendants' motions on abstention, laches, lack of state action and
failure to name a party grounds, see id. at 675-76, but held that there was not a substan-
tial likelihood that the plaintiffs would succeed on the merits because they could not
prove discriminatory intent. See id. at 677.
190 Bean, 482 F. Supp at 679.
191 See id. at 677-79.
192 Bean, 482 F. Supp at 679-80.
193 Id. at 680. The court goes on to talk about what the plaintiffs should attempt to
show at trial, presumably while the solid waste facility is being built.
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Why, if the decision to locate the solid waste facility near an
un-air conditioned African-American school was both "unfortunate
and insensitive," 94 where there was strongly suspicious non-statisti-
cal evidence of intent, and where the statistical evidence was equiv-
ocal at best, but certainly did not demonstrate that plaintiffs'
arguments were without merit, did Judge McDonald feel Village of
Arlington Heights forced him to deny the plaintiffs' requested relief?.
Does it matter that Village of Arlington Heights was an equal protec-
tion case in which the Supreme Court held that intent must be
demonstrated to show a Fourteenth Amendment violation? Thus,
does Bean demonstrate that § 1983 and the Equal Protection
Clause are equally toothless in their inability to protect minorities
from zoning decisions and facilities placement decisions reflecting
environmental racism?
In Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670, the court had to
decide whether the placement of a highway had a disparate racial
impact. An extension of Interstate 670 from downtown Columbus
to the Columbus Airport was to pass through an area that was fifty
to ninety percent African-American.' 9 5 How did this case differ
from Bean and Village of Arlington Heights? Since the highway was to
be constructed, in part, with federal funds, the Civil Rights Act of
1964 was implicated. '96 Unlike the other two cases, which involved
the Equal Protection Clause and § 1983, which both require dis-
criminatory intent, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 can be violated by
discriminatory impact alone without a showing of discriminatory
intent.1
97
If the plaintiffs had "made a prima facie showing of disparate
effect upon racial minorities,"'98 should they be granted the relief
194 Id
195 Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670, 608 F. Supp. at 113-14. Sixty
households and 191 persons were to be displaced. The residents of one-third of the
displaced households were living below the poverty line; about three-quarters of the
displaced persons were African-American.
')6 Id. at 126. Title VI of the 1964 Act provides that "[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the grounds of race, color, or national origin ... be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.)
197 Id. (citing Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Com'n of the City of New York, 463
U.S. 582, 583 (1983) (plaintiffs need not prove discriminatory intent to establish a
violation of Title VI because administrative regulations only require showing of ef-
fect)); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1974) (San Francisco Unified School
District violated Tide VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare's regulations by failing to establish a program for students
who complained of language problems).
198 Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670, 608 F. Supp at 127.
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they sought? 99 Have we finally found a statute that will effectively
counter environmental racism? Apparently not. The court first
concludes that Title VI of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 does not
constitute a per se prohibition of actions that have discriminatory
impact,2"' but that once plaintiffs have made a prima facie case of
such effect, defendants can still triumph "by articulating legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons"2" 1 for the decision. Further, the plain-
tiffs are still burdened with demonstrating that there were alterna-
tive, less discriminatory alternatives to consider.20 2
Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif2 3 seemed to
provide a way out of the effects but no intent conundrum, holding
that private individuals may sue under discriminatory effects regu-
lations promulgated pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. However, the Supreme Court reversed the case without com-
ment in 1998.204
C. Poverty, socio-economic status
I devote the time to consider eleven cases to the intersection
of poverty law and property law. In addition to the introductory
case discussed first below, the poverty law cases fall into two basic
categories: landlord and tenant law, which includes six cases, and
exclusionary zoning, illustrated by four cases.20 5
1. Landlord and Tenant law
For obvious reasons, many of the cases at the intersection of
poverty law and property law fall in the area of landlord and tenant
relations.
199 Id. at 112. Plaintiffs were seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief, al-
though the project had proceeded along quite far before the case was handed down.
200 Id. at 127.
201 Id.
202 id. at 127-28.
203 132 F.3d 925, 930 (3d Cir. 1997), rev'd. 524 U.S. 974 (1998) (mem.).
204 See Jerome Balter, Environmental Justice: Time for Meaningful Action, 18 TEMP.
ENVrL. L. & TECH. J. 153 (Spring 2000); Kristen L. Raney, The Role of Title VI in Chester
Residents v. Seif" Is The Future of Environmental Justice Really Brighter? 14 J. NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENvrL. L. 135 (1999); Amanda C.L. Vig, Case Note, Using Title VI to Salvage
Civil Rights From Waste: Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif 67 U. CN. L.
REv. 907 (Spring 1999).
205 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(Texas system of allocating school funds based on property tax of school districts was
not violative of Equal Protection Clause) is clearly a case at the intersection of poverty
and property law, but I reserve it for Constitutional Law. But see CHUSED, supra note
28, at 573.
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a. The right to exclude
During the first week of class 20 6 I use State v. Shack217 to illus-
trate that the special needs of the poor, such as migrant workers,
may outweigh traditional property rights such as the "essential 20 8
right to exclude.20 9 I ask students to note the date of the case and
remind them of the civil rights struggle being waged by migrant
workers at that time, including the boycotts led by Cesar Chavez
and the United Farmworkers. 21 0 The court declined to hear the
defendants' constitutional arguments,211 but instead did a good job
of addressing these social issues from a pure property law perspec-
tive, stating, "[h] ere we are concerned with a highly disadvantaged
segment of our society. "212 It also described the farmworkers as
206 As noted, I use CRIBBET, which includes State v. Shack in its introductory
materials.
207 State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971), included in CRiBBET supra note 12, at
14. See also RABIN, KwALL & KWALL, supra note 31, at 9 as part of the first problem in
the problem-oriented text; CASNER, ET AL, supra note 35, at 14; BERGER & WILLIAMS,
supra note 38, at 96 (including photograph of migrant worker housing and lengthy
notes which include a long quote from RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
32-35 (4th ed. 1992), as well as the quote with which I open this article; BRUCE & ELY,
supra note 34, at 674; SINGER, supra note 48, at 106-11; DWYER & MENNELL, supra note
57, at 372; JOHNSON, ET AL, supra note 64, at 71; CHusED, supra note 28, at 557.
208 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
209 In Shack, supra note 207, the complainant, Tedesco, was a farmer who em-
ployed migrant workers and housed them on his property as part of their compensa-
tion. Id. at 370. The defendants were Shack, a staff attorney for the Farm Workers
Division of Camden Regional Legal Services ("CRLS"), a nonprofit federally funded
corporation, and Tejeras of the Farm Workers Division of Southwest Citizens Organi-
zation for Poverty Elimination ("SCOPE"), also a nonprofit federally funded corpora-
tion). Id. Tejeras had gone to Tedesco's farm earlier to take Tona Rivera, a migrant
worker, to the hospital because a wound on his face was festering due to a lack of
treatment, but had been driven away by an armed Tedesco. The next day Tejeras,
Shack and New York Times reporter Ronald Sullivan went to Tedesco's farm, the site
of previous disagreements over access. Id. Tedesco intercepted the two and insisted
that they only talk to the migrant workers in his office and in his presence. They
declined and all three were arrested for trespassing. Id. at 370-71. The trial court
convicted two defendants. Id. at 370. Sullivan's case was severed because of the First
Amendment overtones, and the reporter's counterclaim for battery. See CHUSED,
supra note 28, at 555-56 for additional factual background not contained in the court
opinion.
210 See PETER MATrHIESSEN, SAL SI PUEDES (ESCAPE IF You CAN): CESAR CHAVEZ AND
THE NEW AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2000). Professor Morris recommends the works of
Professor Marc Linder regarding the flight of farm workers. See, Morris, supra note
20, at 1005, n. 31 and materials cited therein.
211 The defendants in Shack, supra note 207, at 372, argued that their First Amend-
ment rights had been violated, citing to the "company town" case, (Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946)), and that application of the trespass statute violated the
Supremacy Clause, because it defeated the purpose of federal statutes under which
SCOPE and CRLS were funded.
212 Id.
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"unorganized and without economic or political power."2"' The
court makes a clear statement of what will become a theme of the
semester, "[a] man's right in his real property of course is not abso-
lute. ' 2 14 1 always try to lead the class to suggest that it may be in the
farmer's interest to keep the workers ignorant of the rights to
which they may be entitled.215 I end the discussion of Shack with
the following quote, "[tihese rights are too fundamental to be de-
nied on the basis of an interest in real property and too fragile to
be left to the unequal bargaining strength of the parties."216
State v. Shack is discussed during the first week of class, not
because of any insight on my part, but because Cribbet includes it
in the introductory chapter. The Dukeminier and Krier text, Ra-
bin, Kwall and Kwall, the Casner text, Berger and Williams and
Johnson all do the same. However, not all of the texts do much in
the subsequent notes to put the case in context,217 a weakness Pro-
fessor Morris points out in regard to the Dukeminier and Krier
text.21 8 Professors Berger and Williams do an excellent job. How-
ever, the most extensive treatment is in Professor Chused's text,219
which includes a great deal of factual background, citations to the
New York Times' coverage of the events and the case, and a fruitful
discussion of the case as an example ofjudicial application of natu-
ral law theory.22°
213 Id.
214 Id. at 373, (citing BROOM, LEGAL MAXIMS 238 (10th ed. Kersley 1939)).
215 The court noted that the ends to which SCOPE and CRLS are dedicated "would
not be gained if the intended beneficiaries could be insulated from efforts to reach
them." Id. at 372. Further, the court stated, "[w]e find it unthinkable that the farmer-
employer can assert a right to isolate the migrant worker in any respect significant for
the worker's well-being." Id. at 374.
216 Id. at 374-75.
217 See, e.g. DUKEMINIER, supra note 20, at 101-03.
218 Morris, supra note 20, at 1003-07. Professor Morris points out that neither the
case nor accompanying materials present Mr. (Morris postulates that the court never
mentions his first name as a sign of scorn) Tedesco's side of the story. Id. at 1005-06.
[His first name was Morris.] This discussion thread is left up to the professor. It is my
experience that there is always someone in any given class that will side with the prop-
erty owner and get the real discussion rolling.
219 See CHUSED, supra note 28, at 554-65.
220 Id. at 565. Professor Chused argues that the keynote statement of the case -
"Property rights serve human values" - "affirms that the natural value of each person
is more important than property rights held by [the landowner.]" He places Shack
within the natural law framework of Johnson's Great Society and the Civil Rights
Movement [the capitalization is Professor Chused's.] He concludes, "[m]ight it have
been making an attempt to use natural law theories of justice to aid its efforts to




A number of landlord and tenant cases provide fertile grounds
for discussion..22 1 In Brown v. Southhall Really,222 a suit essentially
over $230 in unpaid rent, the landlord was on notice that there
were District of Columbia Housing Code violations in the base-
ment apartment when he signed the lease with the plaintiff.223 The
court applied the general rule that an illegal contract made in vio-
lation of a statute designed for police or regulatory purposes is
void.224
Javins, Saunders and Ross v. First National Realty2 5 differs from
221 I begin this discussion with this quote from a case not covered:
Miserable and disreputable housing conditions do more than spread
disease and crime and immorality. They may also suffocate the spirit by
reducing the people who live there to the status of cattle. They may
indeed make living an almost insufferable burden. They may also be an
ugly sore, a blight on the community which robs it of charm, which
makes it a place from which men turn. The misery of housing may de-
spoil a community as an open sewer may ruin a river.
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954) (taking private property and then convey-
ing back to another private party to rid the area of slums was held constitutionally
permissible); quoted in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1973) (in a
portion not reproduced in CRIBBET, supra note 12.) See infra note 426-34, and accom-
panying text.
222 237 A.2d 834, 835 (D.C. Ct. Apps. 1968), included in CRIBBET supra note 12, at
409; DUKEMINIER & KRiR, supra note 20, at 532 (note case only); not included in
BERNHARDT, supra note 63, which includes Green v. Superior Court, (Cal., 1974) (rec-
ognizing implied warranty of habitability in residential leases in California); JOHNSON,
ET AL, supra note 64, at 351 (note case only); HYLTON, supra note 73, at 455 (with
additional excerpts from a representative local housing code).
223 There was "an obstructed commode, a broken railing and insufficient ceiling
height in the basement." Id. at 836.
224 Id. at 837. The court found no reason to fit the case into any of the exceptions
to the rule, finding instead that public policy suggested it be applied.
225 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). Included in
BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 38, at 292 (introduced by an excellent discussion of
the history of tenement house law as it evolved into modern housing codes (with
illustrations), and followed by a number of interesting notes, cases and excerpts);
CASNER, ET AL, supra note 35, at 400 (reprintingJavins at length, and then following it
with excellent notes and cites, including: Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of
Habitability on Low Income Housing: 'Milking' and Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REjv.
485 (1987) (arguing that enforcing a nondisclaimable warranty of habitability would
benefit low income tenants at the expense of their landlords), and Bruce Ackerman,
Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies
and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L. J. 1093 (1971) (analyzing housing code
enforcement and its effect on slum housing); CRIBBET, supra note 12, at 447; DWvER &
MENNELL, supra note 57, at 634 (includes a detailed section on tenant's rights to habit-
able premises, which includes an excerpt from Charles Meyers's article, The Covenant
of Habitability and the American Law Institute, 27 STAN. L. REV. 879, 889-93 (arguing that
imposition of a warranty of habitability will ultimately hurt the market for low-income
housing)); HYLTON, ET AL, supra note 73, at 441;JOHNSON, ET AL, supra note 64, at 340;
and SINGER, supra note 48, at 815-21. Not included in NELSON, ET AL, supra note 67.
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the earlier District of Columbia case, Brown, in that the 1,500
Housing Code violations arose during the course of the lease and
apparently were not present at the lease signing. 227 Thus, the court
could not rely on the illegal contract argument advanced previ-
ously. Instead, the court found a warranty of habitability based on
standards set in the Housing Code to be implied in the leases of
urban residential units. 228 The remedies for breaches of such war-
ranties are the standard remedies available for breach of con-
tract.229 In so holding, the court had to go against traditional
common law doctrine that held that the landlord has no duty to
make repairs during the course of the leasehold unless there was a
covenant to do so in written lease contract. 230 Finding that, "' [t] he
continued vitality of the common law * * * depends upon its ability
to reflect contemporary community values and ethics,"' 2 31 the
court considered the changing nature of the interests in a lease-
hold from feudal and rural to modem and urban, the court stated
that, "poor housing is detrimental to the whole society, not merely
to the unlucky ones who must suffer the daily indignity of living in
a slum."
2 3 2
Professor Cribbet notes that this was a very influential case:
more than forty states followed suit and found that residential
leases contained implied warranties of habitability. 233 Do such im-
plied warranties reflect the courts' views that tenants in general,
poor tenants in particular suffer from their unequal bargaining
power vis a vis landlords?
However, that text contains Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202 (NJ. 1984), which fol-
lowed and cited Javins, and contains a number of good references.
226 Discussed supra note 222-24, and accompanying text.
227 Javins, supra note 227, at 1073. There were approximately 1,500 violations of
the Housing Code in the building.
228 Id. at 1072-73.
229 Id. at 1072.
230 Id. at 1074. In so doing, the court quoted another theme I stress in property
law: "'the body of property law * * *, more than almost any other branch of law, has
been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical.'" Id. (quoting Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960)).
231 Id. (quoting its own earlier opinion of Whetzel v. Jess Fischer Management Co.,
282 F.2d 943, 946 (1960)).
232 Id. at 1079-80.
233 See CRIBBET, supra note 12, at 460, n.4. Accord, SINGER, supra n. 48, at 822 ("al-
most all states"); "Judge J. Skelly Wright's eloquent opinion in javins, is credited with
supplying the impetus for one of the most striking reforms in the common law of
property." JOHNSON, ET AL, supra note 64, at 349.
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c. The Fair Housing Act
The Fair Housing Act 234 has generated a number of useful
cases. Three are presented below.
Asbury v. Brougham2 5 presents a fairly straightforward example
of violation of section 1982 and the Fair Housing Act as well as
laying out the three-part McDonnell Douglas analysis.236 The viola-
tion was fairly clear, Asbury, an African-American woman with suffi-
cient income to qualify for the apartment complex in question, was
told there were no vacancies at Brougham Estates, and then
steered her towards Westminster Apartments, a predominantly
black complex. 2 7 However, the next day Asbury's white sister-in-
law received different treatment. 238 The court concluded that As-
bury had made a prima facie case that several townhouses that were
subsequently made available to white males could have been
rented to Asbury.239 The court rejected the complex's claim that
Asbury had too many children for the available units, as pretex-
tual.240 It also disagreed that evidence of minority occupancy in
the twenty- to twenty-five percent range conclusively rebutted the
claim of intentional discrimination.24' In upholding the award of
punitive damages for outrageous conduct, the court noted that a
policy of denying that there were any vacancies until after the
rental manager had visually observed the prospective tenant, and
234 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994), included in CRIBBET supra note 12, at 414; DuKEMINIER
& KRIER, supra note 20, at 460-77 (including Soules v. HUD, 967 F.2d 817 (7th Cir.
1992)); BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 38, at 1048. Not included in BRUCE & ELY,
supra note 34, but discussed in cases at 695-707 and 867-73; HYLTON ET AL, supra note
73, at 617 (briefly); JOHNSON, ET AL, supra note 64, at 287; SINGER, supra note 48, at
939-1042.
235 866 F.2d 1276 (10t Cir. 1989). Included in CASNER, ET AL, supra note 35, at 839;
CRIBBET, supra note 12, at 46; JOHNSON, ET AL, supra note 64, at 290; SINGER, supra note
48, at 945-50.
236 Id. at 1279. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under
McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must first come forward with prima facie proof of
discrimination. Then the burden shifts to the defendant to produce evidence of legit-
imate, non-discriminatory reasons for not renting or for refusing to negotiate for
rental. Third, the plaintiff must then show that the reasons put forward were
pretextual.
237 Id. at 1280.
238 Id. at 1280-81.
239 Id. at 1281.
240 Id. Asbury may have been ineligible for certain units because of her child, but
there was evidence that exceptions to these rules had been granted on several
occasions.
241 Id. at 1281-82. African-American occupancy was twenty percent in 1983 and
twenty-five percent in 1984. This figure may get some students thinking about the
concept of "tipping" that figures heavily in the Starrett case. See infra notes 244-64,
and accompanying text.
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other policies that could be used to exclude tenants, such as the
"no child rule," were not written down and, thus, could be used to
exclude tenants based upon racial animus. 24 2 Finally, the plaintiff
was awarded costs and attorney fees for successfully defending her
appeal, but was denied damages and double costs, because, the
court held, the appeal was not frivolous.243
By contrast to the unambiguous nature of the violation in As-
bury, United States v. Starrett City Associates244 presents a more ambig-
uous fact pattern and generally produces a discussion that mirrors
the academic literature.245 Starrett City is the largest housing de-
velopment in the nation, consisting of 5,881 units in forty-sixhigh-
rise buildings.24 6 The developer pledged to maintain a racial distri-
bution among its tenants of sixty-four percent white, twenty-two
percent African-American and eight percent Hispanic, 247 at least in
part at the behest of the City of New York.24 ' This distribution, of
course, could only be accomplished by a non-color-blind policy,
which the developers argued was not motivated by any racial ani-
mus, but rather to prevent "white flight" and "tipping."249 However,
the result of the integration plan was that minority applicants
242 Id. at 1282-83. The policies had resulted in other complaints against Brougham
Estates.
243 Id. at 1284. Such awards are allowed under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(10) (Supp. V
2000).
244 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988). Included in DWYER & MENNELL, supra note 57, at
657; JOHNSON, ET AL, supra note 64, at 304; KURTZ & HOVENKAMP, supra note 79, at
968; RABIN, KWALL & KWALL, supra note 31, at 105 (as a major case with additional
notes, including a quote from Professor James Kushnert, calling Starrett, "the most
significant endorsement of apartheid in America since Plessy v. Ferguson, which up-
held the institution of racial segregation." Id. at 114 (quoting James Kushner, The Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second Generation of Fair Housing, 42 VANiD. L. REv.
1049, 1118 (1989)); and SINGER, supra note 48, at 950-54.
245 The bulk of the academic literature has supported the majority opinion in Star-
rett. However, Starrett City does have its defenders including, Judge Newman, (dis-
senting in Starrett City Associates, 840 F.2d at 1103); Thomas Simon, Double Reverse
Discrimination in Housing: Contextualizing the Starrett City Case, 39 Buir. L. REv. 803(1991) (finding only one commentator writing in defense of Starrett City) and DaleJ.
Louis, Note, Racial Integration in Urban Public Housing: The Method is Legal, the Time has
Come, 34 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 349 (1991).
246 Starrett, 840 F.2d at 1098.
247 Id.
248 The United Housing Foundation (UHF) had originally planned a development
of cooperatives on the site in 1971, and had received a tax abatement for it, but aban-
doned the project. When Starrett City announced that it wanted to take over and
build rental apartments, fears that the development would be filled overwhelmingly
with minorities were expressed by the surrounding community. As a result, the New
York City Board of Estimate only approved the transfer of the abatement upon the




waited up to ten times longer than the average white applicant to
obtain apartments. 250 The resulting lawsuit presented a case of sus-
pect decision-making and strange bedfellows - the NAACP and
President Reagan's anti-affirmative action point man were on the
same side.25'
Affirming the lower court on all particulars, the Second Cir-
cuit noted several points. First, the Fair Housing Act had been en-
acted pursuant to Congress' Thirteenth Amendment 252 powers.253
Second, housing practices with a discriminatory purpose and those
that disproportionately affect minorities without any showing of an-
imus, violate Tide VIII. 25 4 And finally, the court stated that, while
"a race-conscious affirmative action plan does not necessarily vio-
late federal constitutional or statutory provisions,"2 55 the endless
time-frame, the "rigid racial quotas," and the fact that the ceiling
quotas put the burden on those least represented in the political
process, all called into question the validity of the program.256 Al-
though white flight may be taken into account in integration deci-
sions, "it cannot serve tojustify attempts to maintain integration at
Starrett City through inflexible racial quotas that are neither tem-
porary in nature nor used to remedy past racial discrimination or
imbalance within the complex."2 57
250 Id. at 1099.
251 In December 1979, a group of African-American applicants initiated an action
in the Eastern District of New York, and a class was certified in June, 1983. See Arthur
v. Starrett City Assocs., 98 F.R.D. 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). A settlement providing that
Starrett would make an additional thirty-five units a year available to minority appli-
cants for five years was reached in May, 1984. Arthur v. Starrett City Assocs. No. 79-
CV-3096, slip op. at 1 (E.D.N.Y. April 2, 1985). However, the federal government filed
the instant suit one month later in June, 1984 to resolve the issue to determine the
legality of Starrett's policy. United States v. Starrett City Associates, 605 F. Supp. 262,
263 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). The dissent seemed to question this timing. Starrett City Associ-
ates, 840 F.2d at 1105 (Newman, J., dissenting) ('Just one month after that settlement
was reached, the United States filed this suit, ostensibly concerned with vindication of
the rights of the same minority applicants for housing that had just settled their dis-
pute on favorable terms." [emphasis added]). Why then was the suit filed? Professor
Simon casts the decision in light of what he describes as the Reagan administration's
"at best, feeble attempt" at enforcing the Fair Housing Act. In this context, the suit
allowed William Bradford Reynolds, Reagan's Assistant Attorney General, and point
man in the effort to dismantle all affirmative action programs, to demonstrate that he
opposed all quotas. Simon, supra n. 245, at 824-825, (citing Hellman, A Dilemma Grows
in Brooklyn: Starrett City Fights to Keep its Racial Mix, New York, Oct. 17, 1988.)
252 U.S. CONST., AMEND. XIII (1865).
255 Starrett, supra note 246, at 1100.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 1101, (citing United States v. Paradise, 478 U.S. 1019 (1987) (14' amend-
ment); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)
256 Starrett, 840 F.2d at 1102 (citations omitted).
257 Id. However, the court concluded that it "did not intent to imply that race is
20021
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The dissent, calling Starrett City "one of the most successful
examples in the nation of racial integration in housing, "258 noted
that the policy had been carried forward with the knowledge and
financial support of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") .259
They concluded that, at minimum, Starrett City should be allowed
to argue on the merits at trial that their scheme furthered a com-
pelling state interest in promoting integrated housing, and was
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.260 Further, the dissent
would have held that the plan did not violate the Fair Housing Act
because it attempted to achieve racial integration.26'
Thus, the case lends itself to discussion on a number of
"highly controversial issue[s] of social policy,"26 2 in light of the two
clear facts that emerge. On one hand, the intent of the scheme
was to maintain integrated housing, and on the other, the effect
was to make it more difficult for minorities to acquire apartments
in Starrett City. Is it appropriate to acknowledge the realities of
"tipping" and "white flight?" Are color-conscious solutions to real
racial problems ever appropriate? Was the NAACP on the "wrong"
side in the case? What were the Reagan administration's true
motives?
The case of Jancik v. Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment 2 6 3 illustrates another aspect of the Fair Housing Act in action.
Jancik came to the attention of the Leadership Council for Metro-
politan Open Communities (the "Council") when he advertised an
apartment for rent and included phrase "mature person preferred"
in the advertisement. 264 White and African-American testers were
used.2 65 In phone calls he asked about their race and indicated he
always an inappropriate consideration under Title VIII in efforts to promote inte-
grated housing." Id. at 1103.
258 Id. at 1103 (Newman, J., dissenting).
259 Id. at 1104 (Newman, J., dissenting).
260 Id. at 1105 (Newman, J., dissenting).
261 Id. at 1105-06 (Newman, J., dissenting).
262 Id. at 1107 (Newman, J., dissenting).
263 44 F.3d 553 (7 h Cir. 1995), included in CRIBBET supra note 12, at 418. Not
included in CASNER, ET AL, supra note 35, at 843-44, n. 3 (note case); DUKEMINIER &
KRIER, supra note 20 (but, as noted, the authors substitute a case on the Fair Housing
Act, see supra note 234); JOHNSON, ET AL, supra note 64, at 294 in the context of a long
section on the Fair Housing Act, which also includes as a principal case Asbury v.
Brougham, 866 F.2d 1276 (10'" Cir. 1989) and United States v. Starrett City Associates,
, 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988); RABIN, KwALL & KwALL, supra note 31 at 114, n. 15(brief mention in footnote); SINGER, supra note 48, which includes instead Asbury v.
Brougham at 945-50 and United States v. Starrett City Associates, at 950-54.
264 Jancik, 44 F.3d at 554.
265 Id. Some students will usually not know what a "tester" is until this point.
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did not want anyone with children. 266 The Council found that the
advertisement violated the Fair Housing Act's prohibition on ad-
vertisements that indicate a preference based on familial status,
and the phone statements did so in regard to both race and famil-
ial status. 2 6 7
After leading the students through the mechanics of the com-
plaint process,261 I turn to the significant issue of the lowered bur-
dens of proof the plaintiffs face under this section of the Fair
Housing Act. First, violation of the section was based upon an ob-
jective "ordinary reader" standard.269 Second, there is no need to
show intent to discriminate to prove a violation of the section.
270
However, intent to discriminate may be evidence of unlawful dis-
crimination, and the court found such intent inherent in Jancik's
questioning regarding children.2 71 Here, the students need to
note that, although Jancik clearly expressed a preference for adults
without children, he never expressed a preference for one race
over another. Thus, the familiar problem of proving intent might
have presented some difficulty. Here, there was substantial evi-
dence to support the finding of racial discrimination. First, the
court stated that "[t] here is simply no legitimate reason for consid-
ering an applicant's race."2 72 Second, the questions would "suggest
266 Id. at 554-55. The white tester first indicated that her name (Gunderson) was of
Norwegian origin and Jancik then asked whether "that's white Norwegian or black
Norwegian." Id. at 554. The African-American tester was also asked her race but did
not respond. Id. at 555.
267 Id. The Act makes it unlawful:
To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published
any notice, statement or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental
of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national
origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation or
discrimination.
Section 804(c) of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).
268 The Council complained to the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment of Jancik's violations, and HUD's General Council issued a "Determination of
Reasonable Cause and Charge of Discrimination." The matter was then placed before
an Administrative Law Judge, as provided by 42 U.S.C. 3612(b), who awarded dam-
ages of $21,386.14 to the Council. The Judge also awarded $2,000 to the African-
American tester, a civil penalty of $10,000, an injunction against further discrimina-
tion, and, later in response to a subsequent petition, $23,842.50 to the Council for
legal fees. Jancik appealed to the Seventh Circuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3612(i).
Janick, 44 F.3d. at 555.
269 Id. at 556. The court stated that every circuit that had considered the issue had
applied this standard, and cited cases from the Second, Fourth and Sixth Circuits. Id.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 557.
272 Id. (quoting Soules v. HUD, 967 F.2d 817, 824 (2d Cir. 1992) (dicta)).
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
to an ordinary listener that the racial question was part of the same
screening process" as the questions which expressed a familial pref-
erence.2 7" Finally, Jancik had never rented to an African-American
until the Council filed its complaint with HUD.2 74
d. Section 8 Housing
Professor Cribbet previously used one case, Swan v. Gastonia
Housing Authority,275 to illustrate some of the issues raised by the
"Section 8" program.7 6 Most students need a bit of background
information on the program, which built upon the Housing Act of
1937. The Act sought to provide low-income families with direct
financial assistance in order to obtain adequate rental housing,
while enhancing the diversity of rental housing developments con-
taining Section 8 tenants.277
The Swanns were Section 8 tenants under their landlord, Wil-
liam Huffstetler.2 vs When Huffstetler gave them notice of eviction,
the Swanns believed it to be in retaliation for their use of a legal
clinic in an earlier proceeding against the landlord.279 The termi-
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 675 F.2d 1342 (4' Cir. 1982). Swann was included in Cribbet's Sixth edition as
a case-in-chief, but is only included in the Seventh edition as a note case. The case is
not replicated elsewhere, although some texts do provide coverage of Section 8. See
CRIBBET, supra note 12, at 441.
276 Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat.
633 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (1998 & Supp. 11 1990)).
277 An excellent article of manageable length for students, that introduces the Sec-
tion 8 program and highlights some of its problems is, Deborah Kenn, Fighting the
Housing Crisis with Underachieving Programs: The Problem with Section 8, 44 WASH. U. J.
URIS. & CONTEMP. L. 77 (1993). Professor Kenn argues that the Public Housing Agen-
cies, which administers the program and provides payment to landlords, is obligated
to stop rental subsidy payments to landlords that fail to maintain minimum housing
quality standards promulgated by the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment. However, landlords are allowed to evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent. This
a serious loophole, which allows the landlord to circumvent the requirement that the
landlord must only evict a tenant for "good cause," even where the tenant is a "whistle
blower" regarding a health or safety problem in the leasehold. This violates the Due
Process Clause.
278 In 1978, the City of Gastonia acquired and demolished the Swann's home. The
City helped the Swanns relocate by providing them with a Certificate of Family Partici-
pation in the Gastonia Housing Authority's ("GHA") Section 8 program. This certifi-
cation allowed the family to obtain rental subsidies if they could find a landlord
willing to participate. Huffstetler agreed to join the program and entered into a lease
agreement, which allowed for termination by either party with thirty days' notice.
However, GHA's program required that leases were automatically renewed unless a
termination procedure was followed. Swann, 675 F.2d at 1343-44.
279 Huffsteder had previous brought an eviction action against the Swanns, and the
Swanns turned to a legal aid clinic for assistance. The case was dismissed, because
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nation notice was sent to the Gastonia Housing Authority ("GHA"),
and the Swarms asked that it either disapprove the termination or
hold a hearing before deciding the issue. An informal conference
was held and GHA allowed Huffstetler to terminate the leasehold
at the end of the lease term. 28" Rebuffed by GHA, the Swanns initi-
ated a class action suit on behalf of all present and future partici-
pants in Gastonia's Section 8 program.28 '
The District Court held for the Swanns.282 The Fourth Circuit
found that a statutory requirement of good cause for eviction was
implied in § 1437f, which requires the landlord to give notice of
eviction to the agency; a requirement that would be "pointless if
the housing authority was not to exercise some judgment before an
eviction occurs. '283 However, because the Circuit Court found no
basis in the statute for the "full-fledged hearing" required by the
District Court, it was called upon to address the Due Process
Claim. 28 4 For the Due Process Clause to apply, two elements must
be met: there must be an expectation in a continued leasehold ris-
ing to the status of a property interest, and second, the eviction
must constitute state action.285 For the former proposition the
court cited Goldberg v. Kelly. 86 in concluding that "[i]t is now be-
yond question that such statutory entitlements are protected by the
due process clause."287 Since this is the students' first exposure to
the seminal case of Goldberg, I, accordingly, take some time explain-
there had not been adequate notice. Two months later the landlord told them their
lease would not be renewed. Id. at 1344.
280 Id. Notice was given pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d) (1) (B), which required
that a landlord send notice of the termination to the agency. The law allowed tenants
to present their objections, however, it did not explicitly require that there be good
cause for a termination. Id. The court noted that the law had subsequently been
modified (and, thus, was not applicable to the instant case) to require good cause. Id.
at n. 1, (citing § 1437f(d) (1) (B) as amended by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 326(e), 95 Star. 357, 407 (1981)).
281 The Swanns filed a class action suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), alleging
violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the applica-
ble version of § 1437f, which, as noted, did not explicitly require good cause. Id. at
1344.
282 Swann v. Gastonia Housing Authority, 502 F. Supp. 362 (D.C.N.C. 1980). The
court held that a requirement of cause for eviction was implied in the old version of
§ 1437f, which was a constitutionally protected expectation of continued occupancy.
Thus, absent cause for eviction there was state action. In its final order, the court
outlined the elements of the hearing that GHA should provide. See Final Order, April
8, 1981.
283 Swann, 675 F.2d at 1345.
284 Id.
285 Id. at 1345-46.
286 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
287 Swann, 675 F.2d at 1346.
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ing its significance.28 The students have already read Shelley v.
Kraemer89 and, thus, they are prepared to follow the state action
discussion more easily. Finally, the court concluded that the ap-
propriate process due was adequately provided by state court evic-
tion proceedings. 29 0
e. Rent Control
In Pennell v. City of San Jose,2 9 ' faced with the problem of "ex-
cessive and unreasonable rent increases" causing hardships upon
individual tenants, the City adopted a rent control ordinance that
allowed landlords to raise their rents by at least eight percent. The
ordinance required, however, that a hearing officer consider, inter
alia, "hardship to the tenant," in determining whether to allow a
greater increase.292 Landlords objected to this factor, claiming it
caused a taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 293
They argued the first six factors served the purpose of eliminating
288 Of course, students will read Goldberg, as a case-in-chief in their Constitutional
Law and/or Administrative Law classes.
289 See supra notes 101-10, and accompanying text for a discussion of Shelley.
290 Swann, 675 F.2d at 1346-47.
291 485 U.S. 1 (1988). Included in BRUCE & ELY, supra note 34, at 155 (note case
only); CASNER, ET AL, supra note 35, at 1163-64, n. 2 (as a note case in the context of
the regulatory takings cases); CRIBBET, supra note 12, at 468; DWYER & MENNELL, supra
note 57, at 694 (as part of a section on rent controls that includes excerpts from
Richard Arnott, Time for Revisionism on Rent Control?JouRNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPEC-
TrvES 99, 100-02 (Winter 1995), discussing the history of "first generation" rent con-
trols from the World War Two era and "second generation" rent controls that
proliferated in the 1970s. He argues that the almost unanimous opposition of econo-
mists to rent controls has been muted by the changes in second generation rent con-
trols, which may not have a long-term harmful effect on the market); HYLTON, supra
note 73, at 473 (note case in the context of a sub-chapter on rent controls. It includes
Yee v. City of Escondito, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) (discussing constitutionality of rent con-
trols in the context of mobile homes)); SINGER, supra note 48, at 777-81 (note case in
the context of a five-page discussion of rent control). Not included in BERNHARDT,
supra note 63, (which substitutes Sterling v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board, 168
Cal. App. 3d 176 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (rent decreased may be based upon deteriora-
tion in conditions of a rental unit));JOHNSON, ET AL, supra note 64, at 374 (note case
only, but includes a three-page discussion of public housing and rent control); NEL,
SON, ET AL, supra note 67, at 490 (with an additional discussion of rent control).
292 Pennell, 485 U.S. at 4-5. If a landlord wanted to increase rent by more than
eight percent and a tenant objected, the matter would be brought before a Mediation
Hearing Officer, who would decide if the proposed rent increase was "reasonable
under the circumstances." The officer could consider seven factors, the first six of
which are objective and relate to costs and market conditions. The Court focused on
the seventh factor, which is "hardship of the tenant," as that was the focus of the
appellants' objection to the ordinance. Id. at 5, 9.
293 U.S. CONST., AMEND V (1791) ("nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation"), made applicable to the States by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST., AMEND XIV, sec. 1 (1868).
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excessive rents, but the seventh forced landlords to bear "the 'pub-
lic' burden of subsidizing their poor tenants' housing."29 4 Writing
for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that it would be pre-
mature for the Court to consider this key issue, because no hearing
officer had used the "hardship to the tenant" factor to reduce any
landlord's proposed rent.295 Next, the Court held that the ordi-
nance was not "facially invalid" under the Due Process Clause, be-
cause it was not "arbitrary, discriminatory or demonstrably
irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt."29 6 Govern-
ments may intervene in the marketplace to regulate prices for the
protection of consumers. 29 7 Finally, the ordinance did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause on its face because it was rationally
related to a legitimate state interest.29 8
Although Justice Scalia agreed that the ordinance violated
neither the Due Process Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause on
its face, he would have considered the Fifth Amendment argument
and found that the ordinance constituted a taking.29 9 Justice Scalia
saw the ordinance as requiring some people to bear the burdens
that ought to be borne by society as a whole, and saw the solution
in a tax-funded subsidy.3" He viewed the program as a way to en-
act social welfare legislation "off the books," and outside the demo-
cratic process.30 1 But, is it true, as Justice Scalia concludes, that a
landlord is called upon "to remedy a social problem that is none of
his creation?"30 2
f. Retaliatory Eviction
In Edwards v. Habib, ° 3 Mrs. Edwards rented housing from Na-
294 Pennell, 485 U.S. at 9.
295 Id. at 9-10.
296 Id. at 11 (citing Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 727, 769-70 (1968),
(quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934)).
297 Id. at 13.
298 Id. at 14 (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)).
299 Id. at 15 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
300 ld. at 21-22 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
301 Id. at 22 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
302 ld. at 23 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
303 397 F.2d. 687 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. Denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969). Included in
CRIBBET supra note 12, at 495 and Singer, supra note 48, at 836, 840-41. Not included
in BERGER & WILtLAMS, supra note 38, at 318 (as a note case) "An early, influential
case" in the context of the materials discussed, supra note 225, and accompanying
text; BRuCE & ELY, supra note 34, at 133; BuRKE, BURKHART & HELMHOLZ, supra note
70 (which substitutes Building Monitoring Sys., Inc. v. Paxton, 905 P.2d 1215 (Utah
1995) (following Edwards, and initiating the defense of retaliatory eviction in Utah));
CASNER, ET AL, supra note 35, at 498-499 (but cited as "the leading case on the subject"
in a two-page section devoted to retaliatory eviction); DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note
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than Habib on a month-to-month basis. She complained to the
District of Columbia Department of Licenses of more than forty
sanitary violations of the Housing Code that her landlord failed to
fix. Thereafter, Habib gave her a thirty-day statutory notice to va-
cate.3 ° 4 Edwards claimed it was retaliatory eviction. 0 - Although
the general rule had been that a landlord did not need a reason to
evict, the District Court held that promulgation of the Housing
Code effected a change in the relative rights of landlords and te-
nants, and allowed for a defense of retaliatory eviction. 0 6 Edwards
made several constitutional arguments, but the Court did not rely
on them.3 0 7 Instead, the Court based its decision on statutory con-
struction and public policy. The Housing Code demonstrated "a
strong and pervasive congressional concern to secure for the city's
slum dwellers decent, or at least safe and sanitary, places to live." 308
Congress depended on private individuals to report violations;
thus, permitting retaliatory evictions would frustrate the Code's
effectiveness.30 9
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Danaher found that the major-
ity had taken a fundamental property right away from landlords.310
Professor Cribbet omits this dissent,311 but I find it provokes useful
classroom discussion. The dissent argued that if anyone, Congress,
should have effected this change,3 12 and suggested that, "in riot-
torn" Washington it would be hard to determine if the Housing
20 (but retaliatory eviction is discussed at 543-44); DWYER & MENNELL, supra note 57,
at 651 (as a note case in a four-page section on retaliatory eviction);JoHNSON, ET AL,
supra note 64, at 375 (which continues with a follow-up case to Edwards, Robinson v.
Diamond Housing Corporation, 463 F.2d 853 (D.C.Cir. 1972)); NELSON, ET. AL., supra
note 67 (which substitutes Dickhut v. Norton, 173 N.W.2d 297 (Wisc. 1970), which
cites and follows Edwards, and reproducing § 5.101 of the Uniform Residential Land-
lord and Tenant Act; and RABIN, KWALL & KWALL, supra note 31, (but retaliatory evic-
tion is mentioned at 95-96)).
304 Edwards, 397 F.2d at 688-89.
305 Id. at 689.
306 Id. at 690.
307 Id. at 690-98. Edwards argued that denying her the right to report problems
would violate her First Amendment rights. As well, her right to petition the govern-
ment is protected not only from the State's interference, but from private interfer-
ence, too. Professor Cribber omits these lengthy, passages, as they are more
appropriate for a Constitutional Law class. See CRIBBET, supra note 12, at 496.
308 Edwards, 397 F.2d at 700.
309 Id. at 700-01.
310 Id. at 703-04 (DanaherJ., dissenting). Similar coverage ofJudge Robb's dissent
to Robinson is provided in SINGER, supra note 48, at 844-45.
311 CRIBBET, supra note 12, at 498.
312 Edwards, 397 F.2d at 704 (Danaher, J., dissenting, noting that President Lyndon
Johnson had recommended to Congress that it adopt legislation prohibiting retalia-
tory evictions.)
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Code violations were caused by landlords or by the tenants them-




In Stone v. City of Wilton,31 5 the plaintiffs purchased undevel-
oped land with the intent of developing a low-income, federally
subsidized housing project. The purchase was made in June of
1979, and a preliminary plat was filed in December 1979. In March
1980, the planning and zoning commission recommended to the
City Council that the area be rezoned for single-family residents,
due to alleged inadequacies in sewer, water, and electrical ser-
vice.3 16 The plaintiffs, arguing that the service inadequacies were a
mere pretext, saw the decision as motivated "by racial discrimina-
tion against the 'type' of persons who might live in plaintiffs' hous-
ing project."3 1 7 The Court said that it would have adopted a less
deferential standard of review had there been proof of discrimina-
tory purpose, but instead held that the plaintiff had failed to meet
its burden of proof on this issue. 1 8
Another useful case on exclusionary zoning is Britton v. Town
of Chester.3 9 Chester was a New Hampshire "bedroom community"
313 Id. at 705, n. 7 (Danaher, J., dissenting).
314 See, e.g. cases and statutes cited at CASNER, ET AL, supra note 35, at 498-99.
315 331 N.W.2d 398 (Iowa 1983). Included in CRJBBET supra note 12, at 796. Not
included in DWYER & MENNELL, supra note 57 (but the authors devote about thirty
pages to exclusionary zoning, including two Pennsylvania cases: Surrick v. Zoning
Hearing Board, 382 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1977) (communities must bear their "fair share" of
the problem of population growth rather than attempting to limit community size by
exclusionary zoning), and Fernley v. Board of Supervisors of Schuylkill Township, 502
A.2d 585 (Pa. 1985) ("fair share" test not applicable when community attempts to
exclude all multi-family housing)).
316 Stone, 331 N.W.2d at 400-01. At the time of the purchase, three quarters of the
land was zoned for multi-family dwellings, and one quarter was zoned for single family
residential. Id at 400.
317 Id. at 402.
318 Id. at 403. The court then went on to conclude that the plaintiff's investment of
$7,900 in the project gave it no vested rights in continued multi-family zoning, and
declined to award any damages for money already spent or for lost profits. Id. at 403-
405.
319 595 A.2d 492 (N.H. 1991). Included in BERNHARDT, supra note 63, at 651; CPRj-
BET supra note 12, at 796;JOHNSON, ET AL, supra note 64, at 924 (note case only). Not
included in BERGER & WILIAMS, supra note 38, at 987 (note case in discussion of
Mount Laurel doctrine); BRUCE & ELY, supra note 34, at 858; CASNER, ET AL, supra note
35 (but the text devotes thirty-six pages to exclusionary zoning. Id. at 1253-89);
DUKEMINIER & KRJER, supra note 20 (but see infra note 345); DWYER & MENNELL, supra
note 57, at 1001 (note case compared to the Mount Laurel cases). The text notes
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of mostly single-family homes.12' No zoning district within the
town allowed multi-family housing. The plaintiffs were low- and
moderate-income individuals who had been unable to find housing
in the town and a builder who owned twenty-three acres that he
wanted to develop as a multi-family housing development initiated
legal action in 1985. The Town responded in 1986 by amending its
housing ordinance to allow multi-family housing.3 21 However, the
ordinance offered illusory hope, effectively making only 1.73 per-
cent of the Town's land available to multi-family development and
erecting other subjective barriers.322 In an opinion not based on
state constitutional law arguments, 323 the court first held that the
state's Zoning Enabling Act required that local zoning decisions be
made for the health, safety and general welfare of the "commu-
nity," which was defined as a region greater than just the munici-
pality itself.3 24 Further, "growth controls must not be imposed
simply to exclude outsiders" and "towns may not refuse to confront
the future by building a moat around themselves and pulling up
the drawbridge." 325 The court concluded that the "builder's rem-
edy" was appropriately applied in the case. 3 26 Finally, the court
noted that zoning ordinances came about to counter uncontrolled
growth, not to exclude any social or economic group, and a "bla-
tantly exclusionary" ordinance, such as Chester's, could not
stand. 27
In Associated Homebuilders v. City of Livermore,32 s the California
that, while the Mount Laurel decisions generated a great deal of interest, the case's
utility was limited by the fact that the decision was based on the NewJersey Constitu-
tion. By contrast, Britton, was based upon a statute that was taken from the Standard
State Zoning Enabling Act, which is the basis for virtually all states' acts and provides
that property should be zoned "to promote the health, safety and general welfare of
the community." BURKE, BURKHART & HELMHOLZ, supra note 70, at 927; CHUSED,
supra note 28, at 517; JOHNSON, ET AL, supra note 64, at 924.
320 Britton, 595 A.2d at 493.
321 Id. at 493-94.
322 Id. at 494-95.
323 Id. at 496. The idea that courts avoid constitutional resolutions where a contro-
versy can be resolved by interpretation of a statute, may well be new to first year
students.
324 Id. at 495, citing New Hampshire Revised Statute Annotated 674:16.
325 Id. (quoting Beck v. Town of Raymond, 394 A.2d 847 (1978)).
326 Id. at 497. The builder's remedy allows the court to reward the builder who has
devoted time and money to the suit. It also allows the court to fashion a rapid remedy
to the problem without the delays that are likely to occur if the court simply sends the
case back to the municipality. Students generally miss the separation of powers prob-
lem presented by the builder's remedy.
327 Id. at 498.
328 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976). Included in BERGER & WILLIAMs, supra note 38, at 987
(note case); DWYER & MENNELL, supra note 57, at 959; JOHNSON, ET AL, supra note 64,
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Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of an
ordinance halting all growth in the city of Livermore. The court
contrasted it to ordinances that had the more obvious effect of ex-
cluding new poor settlers, but allowing more new rich settlers.
3 1 9
The City had adopted by voter referendum an ordinance prohibit-
ing the issuance of new residential building permits until such time
as local educational, sewage disposal and water supply facilities
complied with specified standards. ° Was the ordinance a rational
measure to assure that no new growth took place until the City's
services caught up to demand? Or, was it a disguised attempt to
assure the "creation of an aristocracy housed in exclusive suburbs
while modest wage earners will be crowded into sterile, monoto-
nous, multifamily projects, or assigned to pockets of marginal hous-
ing on the urban fringe?" 3 ' The majority first held that the
enactment of the ordinance by initiative did not violate state zon-
ing law332 and that the ordinance was not void for vagueness.333
The court then turned to the question of, whether the ordi-
nance was an unconstitutional exercise of the police power. The
plaintiff contended that the ordinance would prevent nonresidents
from migrating to Livermore, infringing upon the constitutionally
protected right to travel. 3 4 The court noted that many commenta-
tors had argued that similar land use ordinances primarily ex-
cluded racial minorities and the poor and, thus, should be subject
to strict scrutiny. However, the court noted that the commentators
focused on ordinances that prohibited less expensive forms of
housing while allowing expensive single-family homes, and, thus,
were distinguishable from the Livermore ordinance banning all
construction. 335 The court concluded that because municipalities
are not isolated islands remote from the needs and problems of the
area in which they are located" the ordinance would be constitu-
tional if it reasonably related to the welfare, not just of the re-
sidents of Livermore, but also the welfare "of those whom it
significantly impacts," which could include a wider region. 36
at 924; and RABIN, KwALL & KWALL, supra note 31, at 730 (in conjunction with prob-
lem on discouraging or controlling growth). Not included in BERNHARDT, supra note
63.
329 Id. at 475-76.
330 Id. at 475.
331 Id. at 494 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
332 Id. at 476-81.
333 Id. at 481-83.
334 Id. at 483.
335 Id. at 484.
336 Id. at 487. Because this last issue could not be resolved on the basis of the
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Justice Mosk would have declared the ordinance unconstitu-
tional on the facts before the court. Agreeing that there is an obli-
gation to enact some limitations on growth, Justice Mosk stated:
But there is a vast qualitative difference when a suburban com-
munity evokes an elitist concept to construct a mythical moat
around its perimeter, not for the benefit of mankind but to ex-
clude all but its fortunate current residents.3 3 7
He noted that because there were no timetables imposed upon the
requirement that the public services be made adequate, "procrasti-
nation produces its own reward" and the ban could go on indefi-
nitely.3 ' Noting that the trend "in the more perceptive
jurisdictions is to prevent municipalities from selfishly donning
blinders to obscure the problems of their neighbors,"13 9 Justice
Mosk concluded that total exclusion was both immoral and
illegal 4 °
b. Mount Laurel I
The Mount Laurel cases before the New Jersey Supreme Court
illustrate a proposition that many first-year law students do not yet
understand: that courts do not simply announce a result and
thereby achieve the desired change. In a very real sense, these
cases introduce students to the difficulties of enforcing judicial de-
cisions in a way that foreshadows Brown J34' and Brown 11342 in Con-
stitutional Law. In the first Mount Laurel case, based on New
information before it, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at
490.
337 Id. at 493 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
338 Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). He compared the instant ordinance with California's
unsuccessful attempt to exclude migrant workers from the "Dust Bowl" states in the
1930s, and then stated:
With a patchwork of enclaves the inevitable result will be creation of an
aristocracy housed in exclusive suburbs while modest wage earners will
be confined to declining neighborhoods, crowded into sterile, monoto-
nous, multifamily projects or assigned to pockets of marginal housing
on the urban fringe. Id. at 494.
339
Id. at 495 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia, South Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel).
340 Id. at 497 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
341 Brown v. Board of Education (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (abrogating the
doctrine of "separate but equal" in education). See, GUNTHER, supra note 17, at 673.
342 Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (States will make
a "prompt and reasonable start" at implementing the holding of Brown 1, and then
proceed "with all deliberate speed.") See, e.g. GUNTHER, supra note 17, at 680. See id.
at 771-93, for a methodology of instruction in the implementation of Brown and the
difficulties encountered by the federal courts in doing so.
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Jersey's State Constitution, the State Supreme Court, "embarked
upon a far more activist role than any other court in addressing
exclusionary land use regulations." 343 There, in 1975, the court
held, that every municipality is required to provide its fair share of
regional needs for low and moderate income housing, not just suffi-
cient housing for the needs of the municipality itself.
344
c. Mount Laurel II
I have students read excerpts from Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II).345 Eight years
later, the court found that, "Mount Laurel remains afflicted with a
blatantly exclusionary ordinance." Further, the court noted, "there
is widespread non-compliance with the constitutional mandate of
our original opinion in this case."3 4 6 The court reiterated that the
constitutional power to zone, delegated to the municipalities, is an
aspect of the police power, and thus, where it is not exercised for
the general welfare violates State Due Process and Equal Protection
requirements.34 v The court used the case to more clearly define
the municipalities' obligations to simplify and speed up litiga-
tion.3" 8 Stating that these obligations could not be satisfied by a
343 CRIBBET supra note 12, at 927.
344 Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d
713 (N.J. 1975).
345 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983). Included in BERGER & WILLAMS, supra note 38, at
980. The text includes Mount Laurel I and Mount Laurel II, and discussion of the
Act, but no discussion of Hills Development Corp. The text also includes a look at,
whether or not the Mount Laurel doctrine was a success or failure, and a tribute to
the late New Jersey Chief Justice Robert Wilentz, who authored Mount Laurel II;
BERNHARDT, supra note 63, at 655 (note case only); BRUCE & ELY, supra note 34, at 865
(as part of a two-page note on cases I, II and III with citations to commentary);
CASNER, ET AI., supra note 35, at 1254. First reproduced Mount Laurel I, then dis-
cussed Mount Laurel II, the responses thereto "including a "bizarre effort" by some
mayors to overturn the decision, the enactment of the New Jersey Fair Housing Act,
and finally, presents Hills Development Co. See discussion infra note 353, and accom-
panying text; CRIBBET supa note 12, at 927; DUKEMINIER & KIUER, supa note 20, at
1065-81. Dukeminier and Krier include a lengthy excerpt from Mount Laurel as well
as notes and a 1997 New York Times article about Mount Laurel's eventual decision to
build the required low- and moderate-income housing. Id. at 1086-89; DWYER & MEN-
NELL, supra note 57, do not reproduce any of the Mount Laurel cases, but do walk
students through them with a fairly detailed set of notes. Id. at 993-1005; HYLTON,
supra note 73, at 185 (note case only); JOHNSON, ET AL, supra note 64, at 903. The text
includes Mount Laurel I and II, but not III; RABIN, KWALL & KwALL, supra note 31, at
701-02; SINGER, supra note 48, at 1030-42, presents Mount Laurel I followed by four
pages of notes, including a discussion of Mount Laurel II, the State Fair Housing Act
and Mount Laurel III.
346 Id. at 410.
347 Id. at 415.
348 Id. at 418.
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"good faith attempt," 49 the court outlined a panalopy of measures
municipalities must take to comply. 35° Turning to the particular
cases on appeal, the court found that Mount Laurel's amended or-
dinance was "little more than a smoke screen attempting to hide
the Township's persistent intention to exclude housing for the
poor."
35 1
d. The New Jersey Fair Housing Act and "Mount Laurel III"
Two years later, the case prompted legislation that transferred
the administration of the municipalities' fair share obligations
from the courts to the Council on Affordable Housing, an adminis-
trative agency. In Hills Development Co. v. Township of Bernards of
Somerset County,35 2 the court upheld the constitutionality of the leg-
islation over protests that it had weakened the Mount Laurel II hold-
ing, but warned that it would again intervene if the new legislation
resulted in further delays.353 Thus, the series of cases also illus-
trates the battles between the courts and the legislatures in the so-
cial arena. Finally, in 1997, Mount Laurel approved a rental
complex of 140 town houses for low- and moderate-income fami-
lies, apparently ending the twenty-six year legal battle.354
D. Gender
A great deal has been written about the inclusion of women's
issues in traditional courses, particularly in torts.3 55 A number of
349 Id. at 419.
350 Id. at 441-59. Municipalities must remove all barriers created by the city to con-
struction of lower income housing; take affirmative steps to achieve their goals; incor-
porate inclusionary zoning devices, such as, incentive zoning permitting a density
increase bonus to builders, and using mandatory set-asides; zoning to allow for mobile
homes; and finally, providing the least cost housing possible where true low income
housing cannot be built.
351 Id. at 460. The court also looked at suits involving the Townships of Chester,
Franklin, Clinton and Mahwah as well as the Borough of Carteret, remanding all
cases in light of the new standards articulated.
352 510 A.2d 621 (N.J. 1986).
353 See CRIBBET supra note 12, at 927, n. 3; Paula Franzese, Mount Laurel Ill: The New
Jersey Supreme Court's Judicious Retreat, 18 SETON HALL L. Ru-v. 30 (1988). Hills is in-
cluded in RABIN, KwALL & KwALL, supra note 31, at 710.
354 Ronald Smothers, Ending Battle, Suburb Allows Homes for Poor, NEw YoRK TIMES,
April 12, 1997, page A-21. Quoted in DUKEMNIER & KRIER, supra note 20, at 1086-89.
355 See Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CoRNri I L. REv.
575 (1993) (noting that feminist theorists have begun to analyze tort concepts, but
substantial areas of tort law have yet to be explored); Leslie Bender, Teaching Torts as if
Gender Matters: Intentional Torts, 2 VA.J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 115 (Spring 1995) (arguing
that gender should be a vital aspect of a torts class); Leslie Bender and Perette Law-
rence, Is Tort Law Male?: Foreseeability Analysis and Property Managers' Liability for Third
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available cases illustrate how gender bias can crop up in unusual
property law contexts. In addition, I present two cases on the
evolving area of landlords' responsibility for rapes of tenants by
third parties on the leasehold premises.
1. Restraints on Marriage
The case of Lewis v. Searles 51 illustrates the sexually-based as-
sumptions that underlie the black letter law. That is, restraints on
marriage are invalid on public policy groundsY 7 It is interesting
to note that the concept is often discussed in gender-neutral terms,
although it is virtually always women who are restrained from mar-
riage. In Lewis, Letitia Lewis owned the land in question. At her
death she had two nieces, Hattie Lewis and Letitia LaForge, and a
nephew, James Lewis.3 5 Unstated, but clear, LaForge was married.
Hattie, on the other hand, who was thirty-eight when the will was
executed, fifty-three when the will was probated and ninety-five at
the time of the trial,351 was never married. 360 The will gave all of
property to Hattie, but contained a provision that if Hattie should
ever marry, the property would go to all three relatives equally.36" '
Hattie initiated the suit, seeking to have title to the land quieted in
her, as Letitia and James were by then dead. She argued that it was
Party Rapes of Residents, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 313 (1993) (illustrating one way in which
tort law is "male as applied" and is biased in its application); Lucinda M. Finley, A
Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41
(Spring 1989) (arguing that feminist theory should be included in the teaching of
torts to reflect society's diversity); Carl Tobias, The Case for a Feminist Torts Casebook, 38
VIL. L. REv. 1517 (1993) (surveying efforts to date, to develop a torts casebook with a
feminist perspective). For similar arguments in other substantive law areas, see Susan
Bisom-Rapp, Contextualizing the Debate: How Feminist and Critical Race Scholarship can
Inform the Teaching of Employment Discrimination Law, 44 J. LEGAL Enuc. 366 (1994)
(suggesting that feminist and critical race theories should be included in an employ-
ment discrimination class); MaryJoe Fnig, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a
Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 1065 (1985) (contracts); Judith Resnik, Revising
the Canon: Feminist Help in Teaching Procedure, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 1181 (1993) (civil
procedure); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Gendering and Engendering Process, 61 U. CIN. L.
REv. 1223 (1993) (civil procedure).
356 452 S.W.2d 153 (Mo. 1970). Included in CRIBBET supra note 12, at 227;
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 20, at 266 (briefly noted without comment); SINGER,
supra note 48, at 631-34 (which follows it with an excerpt from Frug, supra note 355.)
357 See RESTATEMENT (2n) OF CoTRIACrs § 189 (a promise is unenforceable on pub-
lic policy grounds if it is unreasonably in restraint of marriage (my emphasis added)).
358 452 S.W.2d at 154.
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a fee simple determinable.362 She also argued that the prohibition
against marriage was void.363 The heirs of Letitia LaForge and
James Lewis said the will created only a life estate.3 6 4
Should a restraint on marriage be void as against public pol-
icy? The court notes there is case law to that effect, but that it is
riddled with many exceptions.363 The court also notes that, "men
'have a sort of mournful property right, so to speak, in the viduity
of their wives.' ,,36 6 Students are asked to explain "viduity," a term
that has dropped from common use. 3 6 7 Black's Law Dictionary de-
fines it as "widowhood,"36' but the implication is clear from Ox-
ford's English Dictionary. It is of remaining a widow, i.e. not
remarrying, after the husband's death. 9 Or, as one court put it:
It would be extremely difficult to say, why a husband should not
be at liberty to leave a homestead to his wife, without being com-
pelled to let her share it with a successor in his bed, and to use it
as a nest to hatch a brood of strangers to his bloodY
The court then noted the exception created by Winget v.
Gay.371 To the effect that if the bequest is for the widow's support,
and the assumption is that upon re-marriage the new husband will
take up that duty, then this is not a penalty for re-marrying.37 2 The
court in Lewis found that this was the grantor's intent.3 73
362 Hence, the case's placement in the chapter on defeasible fees is presumably the
primary reason for Cribbett's selection of Lewis. The court found that Hattie took a
defeasible fee rather than a life estate. Id. at 156. It is also noteworthy, from a tradi-
tional property law perspective, that only two-thirds of the fee is defeasible, since Hat-
tie keeps one-third in any case. Id. at 157. Other property points include a discussion
of why the other parties could have argued a life estate and generally, how wills and
other grants of property are construed, e.g. in favor of fee interests over life estates.
363 Id.
364 Id. at 155.
365 Id.
366 Id. at 154 (quoting Knost v. Knost, 129 S.W. 665, 667 (Mo. 1910) (the court
refused to uphold a restraint on marriage placed by father against daughter)).
367 Microsoft Word's spelling and grammar function insists I have spelled "viduity"
incorrectly.
368 BLAcK's LAw DICrIONARY 1568 (6h ed.).
369 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (2000), at http://dictionary.oed.com (last
visited 10/2/2000). The term appears to have originated in 1420.
370 Commonwealth v. Stauffer, 10 Pa. 350, 355 (1849) (quoted in Jeffrey G. Sher-
man, Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory of Testamentary Restraints on Conju-
gal and Religious Choices, 99 U. Ih.,. L. REv. 1273 (1999). Professor Sherman notes that
the view that a widow should remain unmarried, even if entitled to remarriage, is
traceable back to Saint Augustine.)
371 28 S.W.2d 999 (Mo. 1930). Of course, this was the more usual case of a husband
imposing the restriction on marriage, Lewis is somewhat unusual in the restraint that
is placed upon a niece.
372 Lewis, 452 S.W.2d at 155-56.
373 Id. at 156.
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2. Curtesy, Dower and the Common Law, Married
Women's Acts
Many of the texts give at least some coverage to the historical
evolution of women's rights in property; coverage, which demon-
strates as strongly as any other topic, the history of male domina-
tion over property law.374 Under English common law, initially
adopted by most of the states, curtesy gave the husband control of
his wife's property for life if he survived her. Dower grew out of the
fact that when the husband died, his property immediately went to
the eldest son who could evict the dowager. The law gave the
widow a one-third interest for her life. Thus, while the husband was
alive, the prospective widow had a form of contingent future inter-
est that could restrict alienation against her interests. Under the
doctrine of coverture, a married woman lost her status as a legal
person, including the ability to contract and control most of her
property. However, in the nineteenth century, the "Married Wo-
men's Property Acts" tore down this gender-based system. This
body of law is of little direct impact, but is of historical interest and
clearly revelatory about attitudes that have not disappeared en-
tirely. Thus, the texts generally provide brief coverage,375 although
Professor Chused devotes a substantial section to the material.
3 76
374 Compare, JOHN SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAw 134 (2000) ("[t]he
historic foundation of American marital property law is gender bias. England's male-
dominated society produced a body of common law that was overtly oriented in favor
of men and against women.")
375 Included in BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 38, at 441-97; BRUCE & ELY, supra
note 34, at 321-25; BuRKE, BuRKHART & HELMHOLZ, supra note 70, at 261-71; CASNER,
ET AL, supra note 35, at 839; CHUSED, supra note, at 140-214. See also infra note 376,
and accompanying text; CRIBBET, supra note 12, at 46; DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note
20, at 383-84; DWYER & MENNELL, supra note 57, at 216-72; KURTZ & HoVEN.mAMP, supra
note 79, at 358404; NELSON, ET AL, supra note 67, at 295-301; RABIN, KwAL- & KwAU.,
supra note 31, at 323; SINGER, supra note 48, at 665-66.
376 See CHUSED, supra note 28, at 147. Professor Chused includes Bradwell v. State
of Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (States may not deny women the right to obtain a
license to practice law, because it is a privilege and immunity of United States citizen-
ship), as well as Justice Bradley's concurring opinion. Bradley stated, "[mlan is, or
should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and
delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupa-
tions of civil life." Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). He also includes Hancett v.
Rice, 22 Ill. App. 442 (Ill. App. Ct. 1886) (discussing the right of wives to own prop-
erty separate from their husbands, before the passage of the "Married Woman's Act of
1869"), and the seminal case of Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (Louisiana
statute that gave husbands, as "head and master," the right to unilaterally dispose of
joint property, was held to violate the Equal Protection Clause).
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3. Tenancy by the Entireties
Prior to teaching D'Ercole v. D'Ercole,77 I have already sug-
gested that the traditional common law tenancy by the entireties3 v8
would violate Due Process and Equal Protection. In D'Ercole, the
plaintiff wife and defendant husband were married for thirty-five
years and were paying for a house during that time.3 7 9 When they
separated, the husband refused to leave the house so she had to
leave and move in with a relative. 80 Under Massachusetts law, the
tenancy by the entireties estate, gave the husband exclusive control
and possession during his lifetime.38 ' Divorce would terminate the
tenancy, 382 allowing her to seek partition. However, the wife was
377 407 F. Supp. 1377 (D.Mass. 1976). Included in BERNHARDT, supra note 63, at
105; CHUSED, supra note 28, at 183 (noting that the statute works a real hardship on
those who cannot divorce for religious reasons, he asks whether the case involves
discrimination on grounds of gender and religion. Id. at 184. Further, he informs
students that the law in question was changed to one of gender neutrality in 1980. Id.
(citing MASS. GEN. LAW ch. 209 § 1)); CRIBBET, supra note 12, at 382. Not included in
BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 38 (discusses tenancy primarily in the context of its
effect on creditors' interests); CASNER, ET AL, supra note 35; Barry Brown, supra note
35, at 962 (suggesting in a review of the previous edition of Casner's text that
D'Ercole, be included in the next edition); DWYER & MENNELL, supra note 57 (only
very briefly discusses tenancy by the entirety); HYLTON, supra note 73 (does include
Robinson v. Trousdale County, 516 S.W.2d 626 (Tenn. 1974) (where husband alone
conveyed deed to tenancy by the entirety property, the court took the opportunity to
abolish coverture), and Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473 (1988) (holding that a wife
obtains a cognizable interest in her husband's professional degree, earned during the
marriage and based, in part, on her efforts));JOHNSON, ET AL, supra note 64 (substi-
tutes Schwab v. Krauss, 566 N.Y.S.2d 974 (App. Div. 3d Dept 1991), and focuses prima-
rily on the rights of creditors); NELSON, ET A.L, supra note 67 (discusses the tenancy by
the entirety); RABIN, KwALL & KWALL, supra note 31 (the authors note that "[p]erhaps
the most archaic feature of a tenancy by the entirety that existed under common law
was the husband's right to use the rents and profits of the property for his own pur-
poses." Id. at 280); SINGER, supra note 48. (Professor Singer includes Sawada v. Endo,
561 P.2d 1291 (Haw. 1977), and focuses primarily on the use of a tenancy by the
entirety to frustrate creditors. However, Singer does include a brief note on "Martial
property and male privileges," and a problem in which a gay male couple buys a
house together and attempts to create a tenancy by the entirety estate through cove-
nants. id. at 659-65.)
378 For an excellent discussion on the history of tenancy by the entiretie estates,
that is not too long to recommend to overworked students, seeJohn V. Orth, Tenancy
by the Entirety: The Strange Career of the Common-law Marital Estate, 1997 B.Y.U.L. REv. 35
(1997).
379 D'Ercole, 407 F. Supp at 1379. It was not clear who had paid for the house, but
the plaintiff had worked during all thirty-five years of marriage. In any case, the par-
ties agreed that the issue was not crucial to the case. Id. at 1379, n. 2.
380 Id. He refused to share the house, sell the house and divide the proceeds, pay
the plaintiff her equitable share of the house or rent the house and divide the
proceeds.
381 Id.
382 Id. at 1379, n.4.
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unable to divorce for religious reasons.18 3
Conceding, as it did, that "the common law concept of ten-
ancy by the entirety is male oriented,"38 4 and that, "a wife who
wants the security of indefeasible survivorship can achieve it only
by means of a male-dominated tenancy,"3 5 the court, nevertheless,
concluded that the tenancy by the entireties does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause. 6 The court suggested, but did not hold,
that it might reach a different conclusion if the choice of the ten-
ancy had been the result of "coercion, ignorance or misrepresenta-
tion."38 7 The slender reed upon which the court supports this
holding is that a Massachusetts resident may choose between any of
the three tenancies: tenancy in common, joint tenancy or, assum-
ing a married couple, tenancy by the entireties when they purchase
real property.388 What I ask (because the court does not) is what
were the relative bargaining positions of husband and wife when
the house was purchased in 1962? Were there really three options
available as to the form in which they held the house and was hav-
ing indefeasible survivorship rights an important concern to the
D'Ercoles?38 9 How are the husband and wife equally protected, if
the husband's right to the property is guaranteed whereas the
wife's right to the property depends upon the will of the probate
court, to which access is certainly not free?
The court also made note of the fact that thousands of Massa-
chusetts residents had opted for this form of tenancy.390 Finally,
the court noted that Mrs. D'Ercole could still call upon the probate
court for relief.391 Of course, this route offered no guarantee.
383 Id. The husband apparently sought to induce his wife into divorce, by offering
her a one-half interest in the house if she agreed to an uncontested divorce.
384 Id. at 1382.
385 Id. at 1379 (quoting Klein v. Mayo, 367 F. Supp 583, 585 (1973), affd, 416 U.S.
953 (1974)).
386 Id. at 1382
387 Id.
388 Id. at 1379.
389 Professor Cribbet asks, " [h] ow realistic is the court's assumption that the plain-
tiff had an option among several categories of concurrent ownership and freely chose
tenancy by the entirety?" CRIBBET supra note 12, at 387, n. 1. Most would agree that
the answer is "not very."
390 D'Ercole, 407 F. Supp at 1382.
391 Id. The probate court had discretionary power to give Mrs. D'Ercole a share of
the property under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 209, §§ 32, 32D and ch. 208, § 34B. Id. at 1381,
n. 9. The defendant had raised this argument as a defense to the plaintiffs claim, but
the court did not reach it because of its conclusion that the statute did not discrimi-
nate against women. Id.
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4. Landlords' Liability for Third Party Assaults
This section is included as part of the section on gender rather
than in landlord tenant law because, the majority of cases have in-
volved sexual assaults against female tenants.
In Walls v. Oxford Management Co.,3 92 the plaintiff was sexually
assaulted on the premises of the apartment complex where she
lived. There had been many crimes against property but none
against persons. 3 93 The court answered two questions:39 4 whether a
landlord had a duty to protect tenants from attack by third parties,
and whether a landlord's implied warranty of habitability required
a landlord to provide security against criminal attack. 5 Turning
to the first question, the court considered two competing rules:
first, all persons have a duty to exercise reasonable care not to sub-
ject others to unreasonable risk, but, secondly, no private persons
have a general duty to protect others from third persons.3 96 The
392 633 A.2d 103 (N.H. 1993). Included in CASNER, ET AL, supra note 35, at 437-38
(brief citation in the context of a short note on the topic); CRIBBET supra note 12, at
482; RABIN, KwALL & KwAu., supra note 31, at 91-92, n. 8. The authors use Walls,
instead Trentacost v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436 (N.J. 1980) (court used implied warranty
theory to find liability for failure to provide adequate security). Professor Cribbet
used Trentacost in his sixth edition, but now mentions as a notecase following Walls.
See CRIBBET supra note 12, at 486. Not included in BERGER & WILLIArs, supra note 38(the text includes the topic of landlord liability and briefly discusses Trentacost v.
Brussel, Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 324 (1981) (landlord
liability for third party rape of tenant based on special relationship, foreseeability and
warranty of habitability), and Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apts. Inc., 382 So. 2d 98 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (landlord liable for third party's rape and murder of tenant for
negligent failure to provide reasonable security measures); DwvER & MENNELL, supra
note 57 (which covers the issue in a long note, including reference to Kline v. 1500
Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C.Cir. 1970) and Trentacost
v. Brussel; BERNHARDT, supra note 63 (substitutes Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping
Center, 863 P.2d 207 (Cal. 1993) (rape at shopping center was not sufficiently fore-
seeable to impose a duty upon center's owner); BRUCE & ELY, supra note 34, at 89(note case only, following Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742 (Pa. 1984) (narrow view of
negligence holding there to be no general duty, absent a landlord's voluntary under-
taking of the duty); JOHNSON, ET AL, supra note 64 (devotes little space to landlords'
liability for criminal acts of third parties); NELSON, ET AL, supra note 67 (which in-
cludes Kline, plus an additional three pages of commentary); and SINGER, supra note
48, at 851, n. 5 (which only briefly mentions the concept).
393 Walls, 633 A.2d at 104. In the previous two years, there had been eleven auto-
mobile thefts, three attempted automobile thefts and thirty-one incidents of criminal
mischief or theft, but no sexual assaults or crimes against the person.
34 The case was filed in the United States District Court for the District of New
Hampshire, which certified the two questions discussed above to the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire.
395 Walls, 633 A.2d at 104.
396 See Leslie Bender with Perette Lawrence, Is Tort Law Male?: Foreseeability Analysis




court noted that at early common law, landlords had considerable
immunity.397 The law of New Hampshire was that the rule, derived
from the "values of the agrarian past," needed to be modified in a
modern urban community in favor of negligence principles.398
Thus, landlords owed a general duty of reasonable care to their
tenants. But, it would be fundamentally unfair to hold landlords
liable for unanticipated criminal acts of third parties as landlords
are not insurers of tenants' safety?399 The court then reviewed four
exceptions to the rule that one is not liable for the acts of third
parties: (1) where there special relationship such as innkeeper-
guest, (2) special temptation has been created by the landlord, e.g.
a known physical defect, (3) where there is overriding foreseeabil-
ity,40 and (4) where there has been a voluntary assumption by the
landlord of the duty to provide security.4 1 The court rejected the
first and third exceptions and limited the second and fourth.4 °2 In
any case, no exception applied to the instant case.
Finally, turning to the second question, whether the implied
warranty of habitability required a landlord to provide security
from third party attacks, the court held that the implied warranty
only warranted against structural defects, because it in part, was
based on standards set in housing codes.403
A more recent Georgia case adopted a more tenant-friendly
approach. In Sturbridge Partners v. Walker,4 4 the court held that
landlords, while not insurers, were responsible for the foreseeable
criminal acts of third parties. 4 5 Further, the court reversed an ear-
lier case that held, as a matter of law, prior criminal acts against
property did not make rape foreseeable.40 6 In Sturbridge Partners,
the plaintiff was raped and sodomized shortly after midnight in
397 Walls, 633 A.2d at 105. Exceptions included: (1) hidden dangers, (2) properties
leased for public use, (3) property the under landlord's control (common staircase
rule), and (4) negligent repairs. Id. at 105.
398 Walls, 633 A.2d at 105, (quotingSargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528, 530 (N.H. 1973)).
399 Walls, 633 A.2d at 105-06.
400 Here the court cited, inter alia, Trentacost v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436 (N.J. 1980)
(court found landlord liable for third party assault based upon implied warranty the-
ory, noted in CRIBBET, supra note 12, at page 482 n. 1; and Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts
Avenue, 439 F.2d 477, 483 (D.C.Cir. 1970).
401 Walls, 633 A.2d at 106.
402 Walls, 633 A.2d at 106-07. The known defect exception would be limited by
proximate causation analysis, and the assumed duty would be limited by the scope of
the duty assumed. Id. at 107.
403 Walls, 633 A.2d at 107.
404 Sturbridge Partners v. Walker, 482 S.E.2d 339 (Ga. 1997).
405 Id.at 340.
406 Id. (reversing Savannah College of Art & Design v. Roe, 409 S.E.2d 848 (1995)).
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May of 1992, following three daytime burglaries that occurred in
vacant apartments in March and April of the same year.40 7 The
court found these events to be "substantially similar" and, thus,
foreseeable.40 8 To the dissent, this ruling was the equivalent of
making the landlord an insurer. 40 9 Is not this rule akin to a bizarre
twist on the "one dog, one bite" rule, allowing each landlord to
yield one rape for free, regardless of the number of crimes against
property taking place in a given locale?
5. Biases in a Variety of Contexts
Sometimes sexual biases are unearthed in strange places.
Grayson v. Holloway41 is, in one sense, a straightforward discussion
of the modern trend away from a strict hierarchical interpretation
of the habendum and granting clauses of a deed. In Grayson, A. J.
Holloway and his wife Manervy Holloway, contemplating that G. P.
Holloway and his wife, May Holloway would take care of them until
their deaths, conveyed him (or them) seventy acres of land. The
granting clause mentioned only G.P. However, the habendum
clause suggested a tenancy by the entireties in G. P. and May.4 11
When G.P. died his heirs claimed the land in fee simple, subject
only to her homestead and dower rights, and May answered as a
tenant by the entireties. She took the land in fee simple upon
G.P.'s death.412 The Chancellor followed the traditional common
law rule and held that the habendum clause was repugnant to the
granting clause since the granting clause gave G.P. a fee simple and
the habendum clause took away from that grant. Thus, the haben-
dum clause was voided and G.P. had a fee simple estate.4 13 On
appeal, the court followed the modern trend (which is the real rea-
son the case in the text) of disregarding the formalities of the
granting clause and habendum clause and instead attempted to de-
termine the grantor's intent from the document as a whole.414 But
what is fascinating is how the court determined the grantor's in-
tent. The two were to take care of the elder Holloways in exchange
for the land and May:
407 Id.
408 Id. at 341.
409 Id. (Benham, C.J., dissenting).
410 Grayson v. Holloway, 313 S.W.2d 555 (Tenn. 1958), included in CraBBET supra
note 12, at 1120.
41] Id. at 556.
412 Id.
413 Id. at 556-57.
414 Id. at 557-58.
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[o]f necessity, was the one who was the main dependence to see
that these old people had enough food properly cooked, clean
clothing and bedding. It certainly was not contemplated that
the son, G. P. Holloway, would do any washing and ironing,
cooking and serving meals, making up beds or perform other
household duties, which usually devolve upon the wife.4 1 5
Thus, a joint undertaking must have been intended. 416
E. Sexual orientation and familial status
The question of whether a landlord can refuse to rent an
apartment to an unmarried couple because of the landlord's relig-
ious convictions remains a controversy in search of a case. In
Thomas & Baker v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission,4 17 a three-
judge panel opinion held that the state and local ordinances which
forbade landlords from refusing to rent to unmarried couples vio-
lated the Free Exercise Clause, and that religion-based exemptions
to the ordinances would not violate the Establishment Clause.4 t s
415 Id. at 558.
416 Id.
417 Thomas Baker v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999).
Both the State of Alaska and the City of Anchorage adopted laws making it unlawful,
inter alia, to sell, lease or rent to persons because of martial status. Id. at 697 (citing
Alaska Stat. § 18.80.240(1), Anchorage Mun. Code § 5.20.020(A)). The Anchorage
ordinance, but not the state statute, also prohibited publication or advertising in con-
nection with the leasing of property that indicated a preference based on marital
status, thus giving rise to the free speech claim. Thomas & Baker, 220 F.3d. at 1137
(citing Anchorage Mun. Code § 5.20.020(GG)). (Although the lawsuit was initiated in
1999, the statute was enacted in 1976.) Thomas & Baker, 165 F.3d. at 724 (Hawkins,
J., dissenting). Thomas and Baker, Christian landlords who believed that unmarried
cohabitation was a sin and that facilitating cohabitation by renting to an unmarried
couple was equally a sin filed suit against various state entities and officials seeking
prospective declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201. Id. at 697. Although neither had been charged with any violation of the law
or been the subject of any complaint, both alleged that they had refused to rent to
unmarried couples in the past and would continue to do so in the future. Id. The
District Court agreed, resulting in the appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Id. The District
Court also agreed that the laws violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4, but the act was subsequently held unconstitutional, see
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), and, so, that issue was not considered
on appeal. Id. at 697, n. 4.
418 First, the court, after a lengthy discussion, concluded that the case was ripe for
review even though there was little to indicate that Thomas or Baker had yet been
harmed in any way. Id. at 697-700. Next, the court held that the laws were not consti-
tutionally infirm because of underinclusiveness. Id. at 700-02. Then, the court strug-
gled with the "hybrid rights" exception of Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), see Keith Sealing, Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and State Constitutional
Prohibitions Against Polygamy are Unconstitutional Under the Free Exercise Clause, 14 GA. ST.
U. L. REv. at 375-79 (March 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Georgia
State University Law Review) ultimately concluding that a generally applicable law
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This case would have had broad implications for religiously-based
discrimination in housing, at least in the Ninth Circuit, had it been
left to stand. As Justice Hawkins noted:
Its potential for harm will be seen when a landlord in this circuit
refuses, on the basis of religious beliefs as honestly and firmly
held as those of Thomas & Baker, to rent or sell housing to di-
vorced individuals, interracial couples, victims of domestic abuse
seeking shelter, or single men or women living together simply
because they cannot afford to do otherwise, in spite of state and
local laws forbidding such discrimination.4" 9
Although, in fairness to the majority, the dissent perhaps went too
far in its "parade of horribles,"420 gay couples who, by definition
are unmarried, could be added to the list. However, rehearing en
that placed a burden on religion would still be subject to strict scrutiny following
Smith if there was a "colorable claim" that it also infringed upon another constitu-
tional right. Thomas & Baker, 165 F.3d. at 702-07. The Court found two such rights.
First, the Court found that there had been a taking under the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment in that the laws interfered with the landlords' dominion and pos-
session of the property. Id. at 707-09. The dissent noted, however, that the statutes
had been enacted in 1976 and Thomas had entered the landlord business in 1986
long after the exclusion of unmarrieds stick had been removed from landlords' bun-
dle of sticks, effectively debunking the regulatory takings claim. (Further, the date
Baker had entered the landlord business was not in the record, arguing against
Baker's standing and the general issue of ripeness.) Id. at 724, n. 11 (Hawkins, J.,
dissenting). Second, the court held that the advertising prohibitions infringed upon
protected religious speech and not merely commercial speech and, thus, violated the
right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. Id. at 709-11. However, the
dissent pointed out that Thomas and Baker were free to speak, write or publish their
views on the immorality of cohabitation in any way they saw fit, but were only prohib-
ited from doing so in the context of the commercial act of renting property, and,
therefore, should be subject to the lesser commercial speech standard. Id. at 725-26.
(Hawkins, J., dissenting). Thus, for the majority two constitutional rights separate
from the Free Exercise Clause were implicated and strict scrutiny was appropriate
under the hybrid rights exception to the general rule of Smith. Under the strict scru-
tiny test, the court first concluded that the laws substantially burdened Thomas and
Baker, see id. at 712-14, in part by distinguishing Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(Sunday closing law did not substantially burden Jewish merchants, who for religious
reasons also closed on Saturdays and, thus, could only be open for business five days a
week). Next, the court concluded that there was no compelling interest in preventing
discrimination on the basis of marital status, see id. at 714-17, doing so, in part, by
severely mischaracterizing Moore. See infra note 435-48, and accompanying text. Fi-
nally, the court deciding that exempting Thomas and Moore from the law based
upon their Christian beliefs would not offend the Establishment Clause, see id. at 717-
18, sorting through "jurisprudential schizophrenia" to apply the "Lemon test." See id.
at 717 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (applying three-pro-
nged secular legislative purpose, principal or primary effect and excessive governmen-
tal entanglement test to determine Establishment Clause violations).
419 Thomas & Baker, 165 F.3d. at 726 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
420 For example, if a landlord discriminated against an interracial couple the major-
ity would probably conclude that even under strict scrutiny applied pursuant to the
hybrid exception to Smith there was a compelling interest in the prevention of racial
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banc was granted,4 2' and, on rehearing, the original opinion was
vacated and the case was remanded with instructions to dismiss
without prejudice. 22 However, calling it "a case in search of a con-
troversy,"4 21 the court focused entirely on the question of ripeness
and did not reach the constitutional questions presented. 2 4 Thus,
this interesting case is problematic for inclusion in a first-year prop-
erty course.42 5
1. The Non-traditional Family
Two Supreme Court cases illustrate the constitutionality of or-
dinances that seek to exclude on the basis of familial status.
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,42 6 the Court upheld a small
community's ordinance restricting land use to one family dwell-
ings.127 The Court found no evidence of animosity against unmar-
discrimination which justified the ordinance, in reliance on Bob Jones University v.
United States, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). See Thomas & Baker, 165 F.3d. at 714-15.
421 Thomas & Baker v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 192 F.3d 1208 (9,' Cir.
1999). As the dissent had pointed out, the court had "decided a controversy that does
not exist, in favor of parties that had suffered no harm" and there had been just two
prosecutions under the laws since their enactment twenty years ago. Thomas &
Baker, 165 F.3d. at 718 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
422 Thomas & Baker v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134 (9" Cir.
2000).
423 Id. at 1137.
424 1&
425 However, it lends itself to analysis in a Constitutional Law course from the per-
spectives of ripeness and regulatory takings, and, of course, to a course in First
Amendment law, concerning the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause,
freedom of speech generally and the definition of commercial speech.
426 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), included in CRIBBET supra
note 12, at 907; DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 20, at 1044-52 (see infra note 431); not
included in CASNER, ET AL., sup-a note 35, which instead includes State v. Baker, 405
A.2d 368 (N.J. 1979) in which the New Jersey Supreme Court chose not to follow
Village of Belle Terre, finding its reasoning "unpersuasive," in holding that an ordi-
nance limiting the definition of "family" to exclude an extended family violated the
state constitution. Included in BERGER & WitaIAMs, supra note 38, at 961 (note case);
BRUCE & ELY, supra note 34, at 854; SINGER, supra note 48, at 1011-14; DWYER & MEN-
NELL, supra note 57 at 940, 950, 951, 954, 959 (note case only) The authors include a
state case, State v. Baker, 405 A.2d 368 (N.J. 1979) (rejecting Village of Belle Terre
and holding that municipalities may not condition residence upon the number of
unrelated persons present within the household), not included in BERNHARDT, supa
note 63; included in JOHNSON, ET AL., supra note 64, at 880 (note case only); included
in NELSON, ET AL., supra note 67, at 1145; BuRxE, BURKHART & HELMHOLZ, sup-a note
70, at 936; HYLTON, CAtIuES, MANDEL KR & FRANZESE, supra note 73, at 150, 659 (note
case only).
427 Village of Belle Terre at 10. The Village of 220 homes and some 700 people
restricted to two the number of non-related persons that could live together in a
home. Id. at 2. Six university students moved into one home and, after they were
ordered to remedy their violation of the ordinance, three tenants and the property
owner filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 2-3.
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ried couples, especially in light of the fact that two unmarried
persons could live together under the ordinance,428 and found that
the ordinance passed the "rational relationship" test.429 Professor
Cribbet includes Justice Marshall's dissent in which he argued that
the ordinance burdened the students' rights of association and pri-
vacy under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and, thus, must
be subject to strict scrutiny.4 3 But, Professor Cribbet omits what
appears to be the motivation behind Justice Marshall's dissent.43 '
After noting that federal courts had acted to insure that zoning not
be used "as a means of confining minorities and the poor to the
ghettos of our central cities, 43 2 he stated:
But zoning authorities cannot validly consider who those per-
sons are, what they believe, or how they choose to live, whether
they are Negro or white, catholic or Jew, Republican or Demo-
crat, married or unmarried.4 3
Thus, to Justice Marshall, the ordinance was not a simple line draw-
ing subject to the deferential rational relationship test, but a more
subtle attempt to "fence out those individuals whose choice of lifes-
tyle differs from that of its current residents."4"4
Most students consider Moore v. City of East Cleveland435 a con-
stitutional "no brainer," but four dissenting justices disagreed.436
Mrs. Moore, a grandmother, was arrested and jailed for five days
and fined twenty-five dollars for violating East Cleveland's housing
ordinance, which limited occupancy of a dwelling to a single fam-
ily, as defined therein. Mrs. Moore's crime was living with her
son and two grandchildren that were cousins rather than broth-
428 Id. at 8.
429 Id. at 10
430 Id. at 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
431 DUKEMINIR & KRIER, supra note 20, at 1049 does not include this quote in its
longer excerpt from Justice Marshall's dissent.
432 Id. at 14 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
433 Id. at 15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
434 Id. at 17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
435 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), included in CRIBBET supra
note 12, at 911; DUKEMINIR & KRR, supra note 20, at 1052-54 (note case); CASNER, ET
AL., supra note 35, at 1230; not included in BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 38; BRUCE
& ELY, supra note 34, at 858 (note case only); SINGER, supra note 48, at 1017-18 (note
case only); DWYER & MENNELL, supra note 57 at 940, 949, 950 (note case only); NEL-
SON, ET aL., supra note 67, at 1078 (briefly mentioned in a section on substantive due
process), BURKE, BuRKHART & HELMHOLZ, supra note 70, at 943, n. 3 (note case only).
436 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist and White.
437 Housing Code of the City of East Cleveland, § 1341.08 (1966), which allowed




ers. 438 Announcing the judgment of the Court, Justice Powell dis-
tinguished Village of Belle Terre,439 as a case involving an ordinance
aimed at unrelated individuals and, simultaneously, as affirming
the importance of family needs and family values.4 4 He found, by
contrast, that the East Cleveland ordinance was guilty of "slicing
deeply into the family itself," by making it a crime for a grand-
mother to live with her grandson. 441
Although Professor Cribbet is correct in omitting the long dis-
cussions of Substantive Due Process,"42 property rights and the
Takings Clause,443 and Mrs. Moore's alleged failure to exhaust her
administrative remedies,4' I find it necessary to supplement with
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion (joined by Justice Marshall)
which is the only one of the six opinions which admits that there is
a racial component to the case.445 Noting that the family pattern
countenanced by the East Cleveland ordinance is reflective of
"white suburbia," Brennan stated, "[t]he Constitution cannot be
interpreted, however, to tolerate the imposition by government
upon the rest of us of white suburbia's preference in patterns of
family living."446 Justice Brennan then went on to marshal socio-
logical evidence of a more prevalent pattern of extended families
among African-Americans.44 7  However, Justice Brennan dis-
counted any racially discriminatory motivation for the
ordinance. 448
2. Sexual Orientation
There does not yet seem to be much coverage of sexual orien-
tation issues in property law texts. The Casner text includes one
case on housing discrimination based on sexual orientation, Hubert
v. Williams,44 9 and lists several other useful cases and articles. Ber-
438 Moore, 431 U.S. at 496-97. The cousin that created the illegality came to live
with Mrs. Moore when his mother died. Id. at 496-97
439 Discussed supra note 426, and accompanying text.
440 Moore, 431 U.S. at 498.
441 Id. at 498-99.
442 Id. at 501-04, 541-52 (White, J., dissenting).
443 Id. at 513-21 (Stevens, J., concurring) (finding the ordinance to be an invasion
of basic property rights and a regulatory taking.
444 Id. at 521-31 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
445 Id. at 506-13 (Brennan, J., concurring).
446 id. at 508 (Brennan, J., concurring).
447 Id. at 509-10, (Brennan, J., concurring).
448 Id. at 510 (Brennan,J., concurring). Indeed, as Justice Stewart pointed out, East
Cleveland was predominantly African-American, with an African-American City Man-
ager and City Commission. Id. at 537 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
449 Hubert v. Williams, 184 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1982); see
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ger and Williams included a brief discussion, noting one case, Bras-
chi v. Stahl Associates.4"50 Professor Singer devotes a section to
discrimination based on sexual orientation, including a later ver-
sion of Braschi v. Stahl Associates,45 and also includes Poff v. Caro,452
in which a landlord refused to rent to homosexuals because he
feared that they might contract AIDS, and, finally, includes a case
in which a community opposed the building of an AIDS hospice,
inter alia, "because of the undesirability of having former drug
users and homosexuals living in Sabana Ward."4 53 Dwyer and Men-
del do not cover the topic. Bernhardt does not discuss the topic.
Nelson does not discuss the topic. Bruce and Ely do not mention
the topic. Johnson does so briefly.4 54 Hylton et al do not discuss
the topic. As discussed above, the issue of religious exemption




Unfortunately, there is always a recent example from the com-
munity to demonstrate that the group home cases are far from a
historical anomaly. As I draft this section, the Town Board of On-
CASNER, ET A,., supra note 35, at 888. In Hubert, a quadriplegic male who required
twenty-four hour care hired as his attendant a lesbian women, and was subsequently
evicted from his apartment. id. at 162. The Appellate Department, Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, held that California's Unruh Act, West Ann. Calif. Civil Code
§ 51 et seq, although on its face applied only to discrimination based upon sex, race,
color, religion, ancestry or national origin, "clearly" protected homosexuals as a class
from discrimination in housing. Id. at 163. In doing so, the court relied upon Marina
Point Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115 (Cal. 1982) (under Unruh Act landlord may not
refuse to rent to family because they have minor children), which was included in
CRiBBET'S Sixth Edition at 436, but reduced to a note case in the Seventh Edition
presumably because of expanded Fair Housing Act coverage.
450 Braschi v. Stahl Associates, 1987 WL 343445 (N.Y. Supp.) (unreported) (homo-
sexual partner of deceased holder of rent-controlled lease could succeed to the lease
in the same manner as legally married surviving spouse).
451 Braschi v. Stahl Associates, 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989); see SINGER, supra note 48
at 770-74.
452 Poff v. Caro, 549 A.2d 900 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987); seeSINGER, supra note
48, at 987-88.
453 Association of Relatives and Friends of AIDS Patients (AFAPS) v. Regulations
and Permits Administration or Administraci6n de Reglamentos y Permisos (ARPE),
740 F. Supp. 95 (P.R. Dec. 1990), included in SINGER, supra note 48 at 1019-21.
454 JOHNSON, ET AL, supra note 64, at 301 (citing Braschi), and Comment, Braschi v.
Stahl: Family Redefined, 8J. HUMAN RTS. 289 (1990).
455 See supra notes 417-25, and accompanying text.
456 See generally, Arlene Kanter, A Home of One's Own: The Fair Housing Amendments
Act of 1988 and Housing Discrimination Against People With Mental Disabilities, 43 Am. U.
L. REV. 925 (exploring the tradition of discrimination against people with mental
disabilities and the strategies used to overcome such discrimination).
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ondaga, a small town adjacent to Syracuse, has voted four to zero to
fight a proposed group home for four developmentally disabled
men after a public hearing in which nearby residents stated that
the home "would pose a threat to their families' safety, lower their
property values and add an unpleasant element to their neighbor-
hood."4 57 Thus, the law "deeply intrudes into family associational
rights that historically have been central, and today remain central,
to a large portion of our population."4 5' The Cribbet text uses
three cases to illustrate these issues, although none of them is
based on the Americans with Disabilities Act4 59 or the 1988 amend-
ments to Title VIII 60 and none is in the context of accommoda-
tions by landlords.461
McMillan v. Iserman4 2 presents a case in which the majority of
457 SeeJennifer Jacobs, Town Opposes Group Home, THE POST-STANDARD, October 12,
2000, page 8 (Neighbors East section). Opposition is also based on the facts that
there are a number of such homes in the town already and the fact that the homes are
not on the tax rolls, but nevertheless use taxpayer-funded services. Id. at 8. Some
speakers expressed the feeling that they didn't want their children to have to look at
"them." See also Janet Duncan, "Group Home in Onondaga a Matter of Human
Rights," THE POST-STANDARD, October 14, 2000, page A-9.
458 Moore, 431 U.S. at 510 (Brennan,J., concurring).
459 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq (West). Discussed in BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note
38, at 1082.
460 Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42U.S.C.A. § § 3601 et seq (West 1994).
Section 3604(f) (3), which defines unlawful discrimination, is included in BERGER &
WILLtIMS, supra note 38, at 1083.
461 See Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1995) (jury should be allowed to
determine if dog had been taught sufficient skills to aid two deaf tenants in deciding
whether landlord violated Fair Housing Amendments Act by refusing to allow them to
keep dog in apartment), included in BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 38, at 1097.
462 McMillian v. Iserman, 327 N.W.2d 559 (MichApp. 1983), included in CRIBBET
supra note 12, at 638; not included in DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 20 (which
illustrates the issue with City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, 514 U.S. 725, 1053 (1995
at 1056-62); not included in BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 38, which substitutes
Rhodes v. Palmetto Pathway Homes, Inc., 400 S.E. 2d 484 (S.C. 1991) (restrictive cove-
nant interpreted not to exclude group homes for the mentally retarded from subdivi-
sion; restrictive covenant would violate South Carolina public policy and the Fair
Housing Amendments Act); not included in SINGER, supra note 48, which includes
instead Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 923 F.2d 91 (8h Cir. 1991) (state
statute requiring that group homes for the mentally retarded be dispersed rather
than clustered together not violative of the Fair Housing Amendment Act of 1988
because the requirement acts to place the homes in the community) SINGER, supra
note 48, at 1021-23; not included in DWYER & MENNELL, supra note 57, which includes
a seven-page discussion on group homes with no full cases; NELSON, ET AL., supra note
67, at 672 (noted as a case which held Shelley's state action doctrine inapplicable),
not included in BuRKE, BURKHART & HELMHOLZ, supra note 70, which substitutes
Costly v. Caromin House, Inc., 313 N.W. 2d 21 (Minn. 1981) (denying injunction and
allowing construction of a group home for six mentally retarded adults and their
house parents in a single-family residential zone) not included in HYLTON, supra note
73, which substitutes Larkin v. State of Michigan Department of Social Services, 89
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students are probably more sympathetic to the result reached by
the majority but can be profitably led to see that perhaps the dis-
sent has the better legal argument. When Iserman acquired the
property in question the deed contained no restrictions that would
have prohibited a state-licensed group residential facility for the
mentally retarded, but it did contain a restrictive covenant that al-
lowed amendment of its restrictions by a three-fourths vote of the
property owners at any time.46 When Iserman contracted with the
Alternate Living Program and Health Assistance to lease the prop-
erty for such a program the homeowners amended the original
deed restrictions which included a reciprocal negative easement, 464
to prohibit such use.4 65 Avoiding the question as an Equal Protec-
tion problem,4 66 the Court held that it would be unfair to force
Iserman to be in breach of contract by enforcing the amended re-
striction,4 67 and that the amended restriction was void as violative
of Michigan's public policy.468 Mindful of the need to limit the
number of situations in which a court voids a contract on a public
policy basis, the Court demonstrated that there was a clear public
policy in favor of providing for the mentally handicapped by refer-
ence to case law,4 6 9 the state constitution 4 70 and legislative enacted
zoning statutes.4 71
F.3d 285 (6"' Cir. 1996) (state law regarding group homes for the mentally retarded is
discriminatory in violation of the Fair Housing Act).
463 McMillan, 327 N.W.2d at 560.
464 The primary purpose of the case is to explicate the negative easement concept.
The case cites to Sanborn v. McLean, 206 N.W. 496 (1925) as the "leading case" on
reciprocal negative easements. My students have just read Sanborn in CRiBBET, supra
note 12, at 628 and have just been reminded of Shelley v. Kramer, which is used in the
introductory materials but referenced again in CRIBBET, supra note 12 at 638. Profes-
sor Cribbet notes that Shelley has not been extended beyond race to situations such
as are now being considered, e.g. mental retardation. Id. at 561.
465 McMillan, 327 N.W.2d at 561.
466 The trial court had concluded that the newly adopted easement discriminated
against the mentally impaired and therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
at 560. The Court of Appeals did not reach the constitutional law question. Id. at 563.
467 Id. at 562.
468 Id. at 562-63.
469 Id. at 563, (citing Bellarmine Hills Assn. v. The Residential Systems Co., 269
N.W.2d 673 (1978), lv. den. 405 Mich. 836 (1979)) (state policy to promote "the devel-
opment and maintenance of quality programs and facilities for the care and treat-
ment of the mentally handicapped.")
470 Id. at 563, (citing M.I. CONST. art. 8, § 8. "Institutions, programs and services
for the care, treatment, education or rehabilitation of those inhabitants who are phys-
ically, mentally or otherwise seriously handicapped shall always be fostered and
supported.")
471 Id. (citing M.C.L. § 125.216a(2); M.S.A. § 5.2961(16a)(2) (zoning ordinances
not to be used to exclude small state-licensed residential homes.)) The court also
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But, as the dissent pointed out, Iserman knew of the deed re-
strictions when he bought the property and also knew that the re-
strictive covenant could be amended at any time.4 7 2 Further, he
had the defenses of frustration of purpose and impossibility of per-
formance available to him should he be sued for breach of con-
tract.4 73 Further, the dissent argued that the Court should exercise
caution in finding contracts void as against public policy, that the
requirements of a zoning law should not be used in the context of
a covenant and that because such facilities are "highly controver-
sial," enforcement of the covenants would not be "cruel or shock-
ing to the average man's sense of justice.
The dissent was forced to face the Equal Protection issue and
it is here that the dissent faltered in distinguishing Shelley as invali-
dating a covenant "directed toward a designated class of per-
sons,"475 whereas the restrictive covenants at issue in this case did
not exclude any designated class of persons but rather prohibited
state-licensed residential facilities. 476 Despite the fact that the num-
ber of persons in such a home was limited to six, the dissent con-
cluded that this "fact" shifted the case from a Shelley analysis to a
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 77 with the permissible purpose of
preserving the single-family character of the neighborhood. 7 s In
light of the fact that the covenant was amended by the land owners
upon learning that a contract had been signed to create a residen-
tial home for the mentally retarded and was drafted in terms of a
prohibition on state-licensed facilities for the mentally retarded,
the dissent's reasoning comes across as transparently
disingenuous.479
noted that other legislation prohibited excessive concentration of such homes in a
given community. Id. at 563 (citing M.C.L. § 331.688(1); M.S.A. § 16.610(8)(1)).
472 Id. at 565 (MacKenzie, J., dissenting).
473 Id. (MacKenzie, J., dissenting), citing 17 AM.JUR.2D, CONTRAcrS, § § 401, 402,
404, pg. 847-50, 851-53.
474 Id. at 566-67 (MacKenzie, J., dissenting). Further, the dissent stated, restrictive
covenants may be valuable property rights. Id. at 567.
475 Id. at 567 (MacKenzie,J., dissenting) (quoting Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 10-
11 (1928).
476 Id. (MacKenzie, J., dissenting).
477 416 U.S. 1(1974) (zoning ordinance which requiring single-family dwellings
bore a rational relationship to objective of preserving single family character of the
neighborhood). Hopefully, some student will note that the dissent had just finished
chiding the majority for applying a state law aimed at zoning to a restrictive covenant
issue before applying a case about zoning to that same covenant issue. Village of Belle
Terre, which is discussed supra note 426, is later discussed as a case-in-chief in CRIB-
BEAT. See id. at 568.
478 McMillan, 327 N.W.2d at 567-68 (MacKenzie, J., dissenting)
479 The covenant was adopted to reference M.C.L. § 125.216a; M.SA.
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Pre-dating the Fair Housing Amendments Act, Application of
Devereux Foundation, Inc.48 illustrates the NIMBY481 principle in the
context of a dormitory for "mentally deficient, weak or abnormal"
students.4"' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found itself resolv-
ing a dispute between "two interests, each in itself legitimate and
wholly commendable,"483 and came down squarely on the side of
irrational prejudice. In finding that the Board of Adjustments had
abused its discretion the court stated that using the building as a
dormitory:
should arouse added apprehension among the neighbors, for
the close presence of persons who are below the normal stan-
dards of mental capacity and are subject to psychological and
psychiatric aberrations not only constitutes a depressing factor
§ 5.2961(16a) M.C.L. §125.286a(2) (defining such facilities as being for persons in
need of twenty-four-hour supervision or care) and M.S.A. §5.2963(16a)(2); M.C.L.§ 125.583b; M.S.A. § 5.2933(2). See McMillan, 327 N.W.2d at 560, 564, 566.
480 41 A.2d 744 (Pa. 1945). Devereux Foundation was reprinted in JOHN CRIBBET,
ET AL., PROPERTY CASES AND MATERIALS at 848 (6 t' Ed. 1990) but was unfortunately
deleted from CRIBBET, supra note 12 (7th ed.). I continue to teach it. See also
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 20, (which illustrates the issue with City ofEdmonds v.
Oxford House, 514 U.S. 725 at 1053 (1995), at 1056-62; not included in CASNER, ET
AL., supra note 35, but substitutes Hill v. Community of Damien of Molokai, 911 P.2d
861 (N.M. 1996) (prohibition on a groups home for AIDS patients violated Fair Hous-
ing Act), CASNER, ET AL., supra note 35, at 847, which also includes Salute v. Stratford
Greens, 888 F. Supp. 17 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (refusal to accept handicapped Section 8
tenant violated the Fair Housing Act), CASNER, ET AL., supra note 35, at 856; not in-
cluded in BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 38, which substitutes Association for Ad-
vancement of the Mentally handicapped, Inc. v. City of Elizabeth, 876 F. Supp. 614(D.N.J. 1994) (municipal ordinance and state statute setting up barriers to establish-
ment of group homes for people with mental disabilities violates the Fair Housing
Amendments Act).
481 "Not in my back yard."
482 Devereaux Foundation, 41 A.2d at 745 (citing Eastown Township zoning
ordinance.)
483 Id. at 744. The foundation built the Devereux School, a boarding school for
children with special psychological needs in 1918 and built on fourteen acres in Eas-
ton Township in 1939. The following year the township adopted a zoning ordinance,
which placed the school in a district that would have allowed an educational institu-
tion as well as a dormitory for "normal" students but would not have allowed a dormi-
tory for "mentally deficient, weak or abnormal" persons unless the Board of
Adjustment granted an exception. The original school was "grandfathered in" due to
the fact that it had started operations the year before. However, the school bought an
adjacent tract in 1943 and desired to use a private residence on the property as a
dormitory. Id. at 745. (The dormitory could have been built on the first parcel, but
wartime building restrictions and material shortages made this practically impossible.
Id at 750 (Jones, J., dissenting.)) The Township's Zoning Administrative Officer de-
nied the needed certificate of occupancy, but the Board of Adjustment granted it an
exception on appeal. Unhappy homeowners appealed to the Court of Common Pleas




calculated to interfere with the enjoyment of home life but even
involves the potential danger of physical disturbances.
84
This pronouncement was made despite the fact that there was ab-
solutely no evidence that the children in question presented any
sort of physical danger. Although "maladjusted," they were al-
lowed to roam freely and not confined or in need of chaperones in
any way; in fact, none of the protesting owners could point to any
incident in which the students had created a public disturbance or
breached the peace in the last five years.48 5 Indeed, the real prob-
lem was that the protesting property owners found the sight of the
students "depressing" and feared the prospect of embarrassment at
having to explain them to their own inquiring children.48 6 Deve-
reux Foundation serves as a great introduction to City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc.4" 7 handed down by the Supreme Court
forty years later.
In City of Cleburne, the Court declined to consider mental ill-
ness as a quasi-suspect class,4 8 but, nevertheless, held that the zon-
ing ordinance in question failed even the rational relationship test
because it was based upon an irrational prejudice against the men-
tally retarded.48 ' The case arose when the Cleburne Living Center
announced its intention to house thirteen retarded men and wo-
men in a four-bedroom house in Cleburne, Texas. The Center was
denied a needed special use permit in a three to one vote by the
City Council.490 After a lengthy analysis of why no heightened scru-
tiny was required,9 1 the Court reviewed all the reasons for the re-
fusal suggested by the city. I stress that the first reason considered
484 Id. at 747.
485 Id. at 748-49 (Jones, J., dissenting).
486 Id. at 749 (Jones, J., dissenting).
487 473 U.S. 432 (1985) reprinted in CRIBBET supra note 12, at 914; RABIN, KWALL &
KwALL, supra note 31, at 771; CASNER, ET AL., supra note 35, at 1241; BERGER & WIL-
IJAms, supra note 38, at 1094 (note case only, as the text focuses on post-Fair Housing
Amendments Act cases); BRucE & ELY, supra note 34, at 873 (note case only); SINGER,
supra note 48, at 1026-27 (note case only); DWYER & MENNELL, supra note 57, at 951
(note case only); JOHNSON, ET AL., supra note 64, at 887 (note case only); NELSON, ET
AL, supra note 67, at 1087 (with two pages of additional notes).
488 Of course, most students take property before Constitutional Law (or, at best,
concurrently with it) and, thus, it is necessary to briefly outline the three levels of
scrutiny applicable to Equal Protection analysis.
480 City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446, 450.
490 Id. at 435-37. Special use permits were required for "[h]ospitals for the insane
or feeble-minded, or alcoholic [sic] or drug addicts, or penal or correctional institu-
tions." Id. at 436-37 (quoting the Cleburne Zoning Ordinance). Uses that were al-
lowed in the zone without special permits included fraternities, sororities, apartments,
nursing homes, homes for the aged and private clubs. Id. at 436, n. 3.
491 Id. at 442-47. Discussion of this topic is best left to Constitutional Law.
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was the negative attitude of the majority of nearby property owners.
The Court held that such attitudes were not a permissible basis for
treating the facility differently than other multiple dwellings.49 2
The City's proffered reasons to demonstrate the lengths to which a
municipality will go to shield its real motivations for an exclusion-
ary zoning or permitting decision. For example, the City claimed it
feared that because the facility was across the street from a junior
high school the students would harass the occupants, but the
school itself included some thirty mentally-retarded students.49 3
The Court concluded that the rejection of the permit "appears to




I believe that at least a brief taste of environmental law (as
opposed to the newer discipline of environmental racism or envi-
ronmental justice) should be introduced to the property law curric-
ulum. Many students will never take an environmental law course.
Alternatively, some students may become interested in environ-
mental law as a result of exposure to just a case or two.495 Professor
Cribbet includes the fascinating case of Sierra Club v. Morton4 96 in
his introductory materials and includes National Audubon Society v.
492 Id. at 448.
493 Id. at 449. The facility was also located in a five-hundred-year-old flood plain,
but this aspect did not concern the City in regard to such facilities as old age homes.
Id. The City expressed concern about legal responsibility for things the mentally re-
tarded might do, but there was no concern about what the occupants of apartments
of fraternity houses might do. Id. Finally, the City was worried about the number of
people that would occupy the facility and the congestion they might cause, but gave
no reason why the retarded required a density regulation not applicable to the other,
permitted uses of the zone. id. at 449-50.
494 Id. at 450. Justice Stevens, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger, ex-
pressed his dissatisfaction with any analysis based on varying levels of scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 451 (Stevens, J., concurring). This argument is
more appropriate to Constitutional Law and is appropriately omitted by Professor
Cribbet. Perhaps the same can be said ofJustice Marshall's opinion, which, inter alia,
would have applied heightened scrutiny based upon "state-mandated segregation and
degradation ... that in its virulence and bigotry rivaled, and indeed paralleled, the
worst excesses ofJim Crow." Id. at 462 (Marshall, J. joined with Blackmun,J., concur-
ring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
495 SeeJoan McGregor, Property Rights and Environmental Protection: Is This Land Made
For You And Me? 31 ARiz. ST. L.J. 391 (rejecting the theory that people should have
little or no responsibility with regard to how they use property, and arguing that prop-
erty rights should consider the future community of people and the environment).
496 405 U.S. 727 (1972), reprinted in CRIBBET supra note 12, at 20; HYLTON ET AL,




Superior Court of Alpine County97 with the water cases in his chapter
on "Interests in Land of Another." However, he dropped Sunnen
Products v. Chemtech4 that had previously been included under the
chapter on "The Methods of Title Insurance" with a page or so of
introductory material.499
1. Generally
In Sierra Club, the United States Forest Service took bids to
develop the previously pristine 00 Mineral King Valley area as a win-
ter ski area and summer recreational area with ski slopes, twenty
miles of highway, power lines and 14,000 visitors daily.501 Walt Dis-
ney Enterprises, Inc.'s thirty-five million dollar plan was ap-
497 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), reprinted in CRIBBEr supra note 12, at 715; RABIN,
KWALL & KwALL, supra note 31, at 687 (as part of a twenty-page assignment on the
public trust doctrine); CASNER, ET AL., supra note 35, at 60, n.2 (note case); not in-
cluded in BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 38 (which instead includes a three-page
discussion of the public trust doctrine); not included in BRUCE & ELY, supra note 34
(but mentioned briefly supra at 349-57 in State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 594 P.2d 1093
(Idaho, 1979); not included in SINGER, supra note 48 but the public trust doctrine is
covered with Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J.
1984) SINGER, supra note 48, at 182-84; DWYER & MENNELL, supra note 57, at 112 (men-
tioned in brief discussion of public trust doctrine); BERNHARDT, supra note 63, at 486
(including a picture of Mono Lake, and selected comparative state code provisions);
NELSON, ET AL, supra note 67, at 172 (brief note and mention of public trust doc-
trine); HYLTON, supra note 73, at 250, which includes twenty-three pages on the public
trust doctrine, including Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
498 658 F. Supp. 276 (E.D. M.O. 1987), reprinted in CRIBBET, (6th ed.) at 1303, but
not CRIBBET, supra note 12; not included in DUKEMINIER & KRiER, supra note 20, which
discusses Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA") briefly at 599-601; not included in BRUCE & ELY, supra note 34 (but CER-
CIA is discussed in a brief section on the increasing impact of environmental law on
real estate transactions. Id. at 670-72.); not included in SINGER, supra note 48, but
CERCLA is discussed at 1074-75, and the state equivalent of CERCLA is covered in
Acme Laundry Co., Inc. v. Secretary of Environmental Affairs, 575 N.E.2d 1086 (Mass.
1991), at 1076-81.
499 Sunnen illustrates the workings of the 1980 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq, as
amended in 1986 by § 107(a), the innocent landowner provision. After Sunnen ac-
quired property from Chemtech that had been used for chemical manufacturing and
storage between 1956 and 1978, hazardous waste contamination was detected which
matched the chemicals formerly handled and stored by Chemtech. Under the origi-
nal CERCLA, the owner of the land at the time of discovery would have been respon-
sible for the cost of the cleanup, even if it exceeded the cost of the land. See United
States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D.Md. 1986) (bank that ac-
quired land in $335,000 foreclosure of mortgage liable for contaminated waste
cleanup costing more than $550,0000), cited in CRIBBET, supra note 12, at 1302. How-
ever, the amended CERCLA gave a private cause of action to Sunnen to recover the
costs from Chemtech. Sunnen, 658 F. Snpp at 278.
500 The area was part of the Sequoia National Forest and had been designated as a
national game refuge by Congress. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 728.
501 Id. at 729.
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proved.502 The Plaintiff, the Sierra Club, filed suit in 1969 seeking
to block the proposal.5 °3 Although the District Court granted a
preliminary injunction,50 4 the Court of Appeals reversed, holding
both that the Sierra Club lacked standing to sue and that it was,
alternatively, not entitled to a preliminary injunction because there
was no adequate showing of irreparable injury and likelihood of
success.5 5 The Supreme Court case turned on the Sierra Club's
standing to sue in light of the fact that it had not alleged economic
injuries.5 0 6 Although the Court stated that:
Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-be-
ing, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our soci-
ety, and the fact that particular environmental interests are
shared by the many rather than the few does not make them less
deserving of legal protection through the judicial process.50 7
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the Sierra Club had
not shown itself to be among those who would be injured by the
project, a requirement of the "injury in fact" test.50 8 The Sierra
Club had argued that its standing was based on being a "represen-
tative of the public. '50 9 Although noting the trend toward increas-
ing recognition that non-economic injuries could give standing to
sue, the Court rejected the idea that an organization with a "mere
'interest in a problem"' would have standing. 5 0 To do so would
lead down a slippery slope; all special interest organizations, "how-
ever small or short-lived" would have standing as would individual
citizens.511
The dissent provides first-year students with their first expo-
sure to great liberal Justice William 0. Douglas. His novel solution
would be to give standing to threatened entities and file suits in
502 Id.
503 The Sierra Club first unsuccessfully sought a public hearing. Id. at 730. In Dis-
trict Court, the Club sought a declaratory judgment that various aspects of the plan
violated federal laws, and preliminary and permanent injunctions to stop the project.
Id.
504 Sierra Club v. Hickel, 1 Env. L. Rep. 20,010 (N.D.Cal. 1969).
505 Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 25, 27 (9 h Cir. 1970).
506 See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734-35.
507 Id. at 734.
508 Id. at 735-36.
509 Id. at 736. The Sierra Club had apparently been conducting camping trips in
the area and various members had used and would continue to use the area, but these
facts were not included in the pleadings. In any case, the Sierra Club declined to rely
on its individualized interest for standing. Id. at 735, n.8.
510 Id. at 739.
511 Id. at 73940.
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their name.51 2 Although necessarily abridged, Justice Douglas' evo-
cative language comes through in Professor Cribbet's except from
this classic dissent. I tell my students that Justice Douglas later re-
ceived the John Muir award from the Sierra Club and had once
served in an unpaid capacity on the Board of Directors.513
2. Public Trust Doctrine
National Audubon Society514 allows discussion of the interaction
of environmental issues, water rights issues and the public trust
doctrine. 5  Beginning in 1940, the predecessor to the California
Water Board allowed the diversion of four fresh water streams for
the use of the City of Los Angeles.51 6 The streams had been flow-
ing into Mono Lake, the second largest lake in California, the
home of a large population of brine shrimp, a refuge for migratory
birds and a lake of scenic, ecological and recreational value.517 As
a result of the diversion, the lake level dropped, salinity increased
and the ecological values were threatened. 518 The diversion had
been approved as part of California's appropriative water rights sys-
tem and was made without consideration for the public trust.51 9
Thus, the court faced the question of how the two competing sys-
tems of water allocation should interact. The court held that the
public trust doctrine gave the state the power to exercise continu-
ous supervision and control over the state's navigable waters,5 20
512 Id. at 741-42 (Douglas, J., dissenting), (citing Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? -
Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 450). Douglas compares the
admiralty action in which a ship is sued (and can counterclaim) in its own name, as
well as suits in the name of corporations. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 742-43, n.2, 3
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
513 See WILItAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975 THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS (1980) 370-71.
514 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
515 National Audubon Society, 658 P.2d at 718. The case traces the history of the
public trust doctrine, both generally and in California. The concept was initiated by
the Institutes ofJustinian and became part of the English common law. In California
it also had an independent origin in Spanish and Mexican law. Id.
516 Id. at 711.
517 Id.
518 Id. At the time of the litigation, there was some dispute as to the degree of
future harm that continued diversion would cause. Los Angeles argued that the lake
would stabilize at about fifty-six percent of its original size, whereas the Audubon Soci-
ety estimated that in fifty years the lake would only be at twenty percent of its original
size and might even dry up completely. Id. at 715.
519 Id. at 712.
520 Even though the lake was navigable, the five streams were not. The court found
caselaw supporting the proposition that non-navigable streams feeding navigable wa-
ters were subject to the public trust doctrine. National Audubon Society, 658 P.2d at
720 (citing People v. Gold Run D. & M. Co., 4 P. 1152 (Cal. 1884) (gold mining
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even where prior rights had been granted pursuant to the appro-
priative rights system.52 ' The court also found that the state had
the power to grant "nonvested usufructuary rights" to use water,
even if such diversions harmed the public trust, so long as the pub-
lic trust values were considered 22 and that consideration had not
taken place in the context of the Mono Lake diversion. 523 Should
such consideration result in a change in use it would not constitute
the taking of property for which compensation was required be-
cause there was no true property right in water, but only a right to
use.52 4 The case lends itself to a discussion of the realities or practi-
calities of environmental protection: the people of Los Angeles
now need and depend on the waters that could resupply Mono
Lake. There is no simple answer.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
"Property rights serve human values."5 25 This is something
that first-year students need to know as much as they need to know
the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. Social justice issues
need to be a part of the first-year law school curriculum. I have
attempted to demonstrate that bringing these issues to the fore is
not antithetical to the coverage of the broad range of material that
must be compressed into a five- or even four-credit property
course. To the contrary, whether the issue is the right to exclude
and the case is State v. Shack,5 26 or acquisition by conquest and the
case is Johnson v. M'Intosh,527 or defeasible fees and the ca*se is Ed-
wards v. Abney,528 cases that raise issues of social justice can serve an
integral role in presenting the essentials of property. While some
casebooks are very weak in this area and would require extensive
supplementation to be used in this manner, others include suffi-
cient amounts of these materials in the texts such that only mini-
mal supplementation is required. No one text is "perfect" for my
goals,529 but no one text is perfect for any professor's goals. But,
for the professor seeking to do so, there are texts available which
procedure that dumped gravel in streams and, in turn, impaired navigation on down-
stream rivers violated public trust).
521 National Audubon Society, 658 P.2d at 712.
522 Id.
523 Id. Thus, such consideration "was long overdue." Id.
524 Id. at 723.
525 State v. Shack, 277 A.2d. 369, 372 (N.J. 1971).
526 See supra notes 207-19, and accompanying text.
527 See supra notes 140-68, and accompanying text.
528 See supra notes 119-25, and accompanying text.
529 1 have declined to pick a "winner," but rather have attempted to describe these
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make learning that property rights serve human values easier for
faculty and student alike.
texts that include cases and subjects in a way that aids the professor in selecting the
appropriate text for her particular needs.

